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Abstract 
 
 
Co-representation has been argued to be a mechanism in adult joint action that allows 
participants in a joint task to co-ordinate their actions with a partner.   Substantial evidence for 
this mechanism has come from tasks such as the joint Simon task (Sebanz, Knoblich & Prinz, 
2003), which show interference from a partner’s task on one’s own performance.  The 
following studies aim to use this mechanism as a measure of children’s joint action abilities 
and a way of directly comparing adult and child behaviours.  Chapter 1 presents three studies 
which suggest a developmental onset of co-representation effects at around 4 years old. 
Chapter 2 attempts to uncover what type of representations may be formed in joint tasks at 
this age.  Chapter 3 presents an individual differences study, suggesting that both Inhibitory 
Control and explicit Theory of Mind, but not Working Memory, play an indirect role in 
avoiding interference from co-representation.  These findings contribute to the Joint Action 
Development literature, by demonstrating at least one way in which adult and child joint 
action may not be comparable.  They also shed light on the adult co-representation literature, 
by highlighting cognitive skills that may interact with co-representation in order to reduce 
potential interference.
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CHAPTER 1.  GENERAL INTRODCUTION 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Joint action is the term that has been adopted in psychological research to describe the 
ways in which individuals can act alongside others, producing a joint outcome. This has 
raised a number of questions regarding the underlying mechanisms involved in such 
interactions and whether individuals with limitations in cognitive capacity and skills, such as 
children and non-human species, can show a true understanding of joint goals and intentions. 
This thesis will focus on two of these questions.  Firstly, it aims to draw parallels between 
adult and child cognition by identifying whether a phenomenon that has been found in adult 
participants, namely joint action or task co-representation, can also be found in children.  If 
children show similar effects to adults then this is evidence that children’s joint action 
abilities are comparable to adults’.  Secondly, it aims to use the outcome of this investigation 
into co-representation to draw conclusions about the level of processing that is involved in co-
representation.  The following Introduction will outline four relevant areas of research that 
contribute to this discussion.  Firstly, existing literature on joint action development will be 
summarised, illustrating the types of joint behaviours that can be seen in young children. 
Theory of Mind and Executive Functions will then be discussed as having a potential role in 
children’s ability to represent a partner’s task or actions.  Lastly, co-representation will be 
presented as a means of investigating the processes involved in joint action in early 
childhood. 
 
1.1 Joint Action and Development 
 
The study of ‘Joint Action’ covers a huge range of phenomena from a huge range of 
scientific approaches and perspectives.  To quote one of the more inclusive definitions, 
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joint action is ‘any form of social interaction whereby two or more individuals coordinate 
their actions in space and time to bring about a change in the environment’ (Sebanz, 
Bekkering & Knoblich, 2006).  This could be anything as apparently thoughtless as 
starlings flocking in a cloud over the Roman skyline to a group of politicians having a 
lively debate about the state of the economy.  Either way, actions that are coordinated 
between individuals require some kind or kinds of mechanism that enable processing of the 
other’s past/present actions and possibly prediction of their future actions.  This section will 
summarise existing findings about children’s abilities to act with a partner as well as the 
controversies that arise due to differing definitions and requirements for ‘true’ joint action. 
Children are clearly capable of acting with others.  Infants know to open their mouths 
when a parent raises a spoon of food, have an evident disposition to imitate others 
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1977), and as they grow older begin to seek out others in order to 
participate in joint play.  From a lay perspective, and particularly from a parent’s 
perspective, these actions seem undeniably joint and reciprocal, thus aiding the emotional 
bond between caregiver and infant.  Research has also backed up this folk psychology 
perspective to some degree.  Several studies have identified scenarios in which young 
children take part in joint activities in both observational and experimental settings.  Hay 
(1979) carried out observational work in which he found that children as young as 18 
months were capable of participating in reciprocal games, such as throwing a ball back and 
forth to a partner, when interacting with a caregiver.  In this case, the goals involved in the 
observed behaviours were abstract, in the sense that they required maintaining an 
interaction with a partner rather than obtaining a tangible goal. 
Tasks with more concrete goals (i.e. retrieving an object from an apparatus) have 
also been employed to study children’s joint action abilities.  Warneken, Chen and 
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Tomasello (2006) asked children to complete four activities with a partner.  Two tasks 
involved problem-solving to retrieve an object from an apparatus (either a toy from an 
elevator and from a tube with two handles).  The other two tasks were social games 
(bouncing a toy together on a small trampoline and dropping objects simultaneously 
down two parallel tubes). All tasks required two people to achieve their goal.  
Additionally, two of the tasks (one problem-solving and one social game) involved 
performing parallel roles, whereby both individuals performed identical, mirrored 
actions (e.g. both pulling on a handle of the tube). The other two tasks involved 
complementary roles (e.g. one individual pushes up the elevator and the other reaches in 
to retrieve the toy).  18-month-olds could participate to some degree in some of these 
tasks, such as the Elevator task (performance at ceiling in Role A) but were less 
successful at others, such as the Tube-with-handles task.  24-month-olds were 
significantly better at co-ordinating with a partner in three out of the four tasks.  This 
suggests some level of cooperative ability in the second year of life.  Further, children’s 
responses to interruptions in task continuity were measured to investigate whether they 
would attempt to re-engage a partner if they inexplicably stopped participating in the 
game.  The authors argue that if children do attempt to re-engage a partner, this is 
evidence that they have an understanding of the joint nature of the task rather than 
simply reacting to a partner’s actions in order to effectively achieve an individual goal.  
In this study, all children made at least one attempt to re-engage their partner, suggesting 
that this is the case. 
Given the above literature, we can certainly argue that children are participating in 
joint action, at least based on the broad definition stated at the outset (Sebanz et al., 2006). 
However, there has been significant debate surrounding how to define joint action, in both 
4 
 
psychological and philosophical arenas.  The main question to be agreed upon is whether 
it is necessary to understand a partner’s intentions in order to perform a genuine joint 
action.  One of the most commonly referenced definitions that assumes these higher level 
requirements comes from Bratman (1992). He argues that there are three requisites for an 
action to be truly joint in nature.  Firstly, actors must be mutually responsive to their 
partner’s intentions and actions.  Secondly, they must be committed to the joint activity.  
Lastly, they must be committed to mutually supporting the actions of the other.  This 
definition clearly states that an individual carrying out a joint action with another 
individual must be able to understand their intentions, interpret their actions and respond 
accordingly, whilst maintaining commitment to achieving the goal. 
Bratman’s definition hints at a further and related question, which is whether it is 
necessary to understand that the actors in a task share a joint goal.  Butterfill and 
Sebanz (2011) give the following example to illustrate this requirement: 
‘Consider Ayesha and Beatrice, who carry a two-handled basket together. If their joint 
carrying is to be an intentional joint carrying, then it is not enough that Ayesha and 
Beatrice each individually intend to carry the basket. After all, their having these intentions 
is consistent with each planning to act alone.’ (pg. 1) 
Thus, according to this level of definition, individuals acting together must both have the 
intention to achieve the same goal.  Further, they must both understand that that goal is 
held jointly, as opposed to simply acting in parallel to achieve an individual goal that 
happens to be the same as a co-actor.  Both of these definitions arguably call for quite a 
high level of cognitive ability in order to take part in joint actions, with a basis in intention 
understanding and the ability to hold a shared representation (of a goal).  This should 
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undoubtedly exclude swarming starlings over the Colosseum.  What remains uncertain is 
whether this should also exclude infants and young children. 
Although the evidence for early joint action behaviours would suggest that infants, at 
least from around two years, are capable of performing tasks with a partner, there are reasons 
to doubt that they actually have a true understanding of the joint nature of their actions. 
Firstly, there are alternative explanations for some of the behaviours demonstrated in joint 
action studies.  Particularly for those studies that involve both partners performing identical 
actions (e.g. Hay, 1979; parallel actions in Warneken et al., 2006), it is difficult to eliminate 
the possibility that children are simply imitating their partner.  For example, when a parent 
throws a ball to the child, the child may simply copy their actions and return the throw.  So, 
what appears to be a reciprocal game may not really show any deeper understanding of the 
shared nature of the game, but rather rely on an intrinsic tendency to copy actions in an 
iterative manner.  Likewise, it may be that children rely on pre-existing learned responses to 
the stimuli in these studies, which are often toys that are familiar to children of this age.  For 
example, children may have learned that ‘balls are for throwing’.  Using this rule, there is no 
need for a child to understand that they are playing a joint game in order for them to show 
the ball throwing behaviour observed in Hay (1979). 
Another reason to be wary of these early joint action studies is that there is evidence that 
such behaviours are heavily scaffolded in development.  Bakeman and Adamson (1984) 
carried out a study in which infants were observed in natural play with their mothers and 
with peers.  They found that whilst 25% of all 18 month-olds’ play was joint when observed 
with their mothers, only 7% was joint when observed with peers.  This suggests that joint 
play is unlikely to be spontaneous in children this young, but rather structured by their 
parents.  Similarly, several of the studies in the joint action literature observe behaviours that 
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occur alongside a parent (Hay, 1979) or at least an adult (Warneken et al., 2006).  Thus, it 
should not be assumed that infants necessarily meet the specifications set out by Bratman 
(1992), as they may simply be performing actions that follow a parent’s lead. 
Another important criticism of existing joint action development literature is that it is 
extremely difficult to measure a child’s understanding of a joint goal.  In many cases, the 
behaviour of a child following an individual goal that happens to coincide with a co-actor 
would be identical to their behaviour following a joint goal.  For example, in Warneken et 
al.’s (2006) problem-solving tasks, children may only have an individual goal in mind (to 
obtain the ball) and may use the adult as a social tool to achieve this goal.  Hamann, 
Warneken and Tomasello (2012) tested this possibility by asking children to participate in 
a pair to retrieve two toys, one for each child.  At two years, children tended to participate 
in the task only up until they retrieved their own goal of retrieving one of the toys.  Only at 
three years would they continue until both they and their partner had retrieved a toy each.  
Even evidence of children’s attempts to re-engage a partner in a task (Warneken et al., 
2006) do not necessarily show an understanding of joint goals or intention understanding.  
For example, when performing a task using my computer, I may make attempts to re-
engage said computer if it decides to stop performing its role in the task.  This does not 
imply that I am assuming that my computer and I have a joint goal or that I think of it as an 
intentional agent (although see Dennett, 1989).  More convincing evidence that intention 
understanding is involved in early joint action comes from studies that show differential 
behaviour dependent on whethera partner fails to perform their task role due to inability as 
opposed to unwillingness.  Behne, Carpenter, Call and Tomasello (2005) found that 9-
month-olds showed more impatient behaviours, such as reaching or looking away, when 
their partner’s failure was due to unwillingness rather than inability.  However, it is still 
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possible that these behaviours may be observed without intention or goal understanding.  If 
my computer fails to perform a function because it does not have the software to do so, I 
may be less infuriated than if it fails to do so for no good reason.  This highlights the 
difficulties involved in this kind of research when trying to establish the existence of an 
understanding that extends beyond the individual.  If Butterfill and Sebanz’s two-handled 
basket example is to be fulfilled, it is necessary to establish such an understanding. 
To summarise, existing joint action literature has provided evidence for joint behaviours 
from around the second year of life.  However, if one assumes a definition of joint action that 
involves higher level cognition, such as intention understanding, it becomes more difficult to 
ascribe such behaviours to very young children.  Instead, the question is raised regarding 
whether the behaviours we can observe at this age can be explained via simpler mechanisms 
that are less cognitively demanding on a young, developing mind.  As Brownell (2011) 
points out, developmental psychologists are left in the position of arguing either that children 
do, in fact, have the pre-requisites for high level joint action (Carpenter, 2009), or that it is 
necessary to explain their behaviour in terms of lower level mechanisms that do not put 
excessive load on the child (see Apperly & Butterfill, 2009).  The following section will 
illustrate current views in children’s early Theory of Mind development with a view to 
evaluating the bases for both of these opposing arguments.  By evaluating what is known 
about early social cognition, we can identify whether it is likely that such high level 
cognition may be involved in early joint action. 
1.2 Early Development of Theory of Mind 
Having outlined intention understanding as a key requirement for joint action 
understanding (at least according to Bratman, 1992), it is appropriate to identify what 
grounds there might be for concluding that children either have or do not have such 
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abilities. The fact that research into ‘Theory of Mind’ has been given so much attention 
over the last three decades and generated such a vast quantity of findings should provide a 
solid basis for drawing conclusions about children’s pre-requisite cognitive abilities for 
understanding joint action.  However, there is still a huge amount of controversy around 
topics within Theory of Mind and particularly surrounding the age at which such abilities 
develop. 
Theory of Mind research catapulted into the forefront of Cognitive Development 
research following publication of Wimmer and Perner’s (1983) false belief paradigm.  This 
classic task involved presenting a story to young children and acting it out with dolls.  In the 
story a protagonist placed an object in one location and then left the room.  While he was 
absent, another actor came and removed the object from the first location and replaced it in a 
second location.  Children were asked where the protagonist would look for the object on his 
return. Results found 57% of 4-6 year-olds and 86% of 6-9 year-olds could correctly answer 
that the protagonist would look in the original location, demonstrating an understanding that 
their knowledge was different from the child’s and from reality.  None of the 3-4 year-olds 
could pass this task, suggesting that understanding of false belief only develops after around 
4 years.  Since this ground-breaking finding, dozens of variations of this paradigm have been 
implemented in order to dig deeper into the underlying echanisms involved in mental state 
understanding.  Two discoveries that have arisen from these investigations are relevant for 
the current discussion, both of which refer to the age at which mental state understanding 
develops.  The first finding is that different types of mental state understanding develop at 
different ages (Lillard & Flavell, 1992).  The second and rather pioneering finding is that it 
may be possible to measure mental state tracking in infants as young as 7 months-old, if 
using implicit, non-verbal measures (Onish & Baillargeon, 2005; Kovács, Téglás & Endress, 
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2010).  By evaluating these findings it may be possible to decide whether children do, in 
fact, have the cognitive abilities necessary for Bratman’s joint action. 
Although Wimmer and Perner’s original paradigm was designed specifically to measure 
understanding of another person’s belief, an important distinction has been made between 
the onset of different types of mental state understanding.  Lillard and Flavell (1992) carried 
out a series of experiments in order to test whether some types of mental state are easier to 
comprehend (at least in terms of being earlier developing) than others.  They presented 3-4 
year-old children with scenarios in a similar format to Wimmer and Perner (1983), but 
varying the type of mental state of the protagonist.  For example, children were asked about 
the desire state of a protagonist, which differed from reality.   Mental states included ‘want’, 
‘pretend’, ‘think’, ‘dream’ and ‘looks like’.  These experiments showed that desire was the 
easiest mental state to compute, which was significantly easier than pretend, which in turn 
was significantly easier than belief.  Dreams and appearance were equal in difficulty to 
belief. These findings are important to consider when contemplating the potential 
involvement of mental state understanding in joint action.  Further investigation would be 
needed to identify which mental states might be useful to compute in a joint task scenario.  If 
the type of mental state understanding necessary for joint action performance is one of those 
which is less cognitively demanding, then it might be more convincing that young children 
are capable of such a behaviour. 
One other possibility is that mental state understanding is actually much less 
demanding and therefore much earlier developing than was thought for the first twenty 
years of Theory of Mind research.  A recurrent criticism of false belief-type paradigms has 
been that they employ tasks that require a high level of both language and executive 
functions.  Linguistic demands are placed on the child in order to understand the dialog of 
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the stories presented to them and executive function is required in order to inhibit one’s 
own belief (or other mental state) or knowledge of reality.  Attempts have been made to 
reduce these demands, for example by designing non-verbal versions of the false belief 
task (Call & Tomasello, 1999) and simplifying the story scenarios (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & 
Frith, 1985).  However, these have found similar developmental results to the original false 
belief task, leading to arguments that although language and executive functions may be 
intrinsically linked to the emergence of Theory of Mind (Milligan, Astington & Dack, 
2007; Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses & Lee, 2006), it seems unlikely they are merely 
inhibiting its expression in false belief tasks. 
However, one hugely innovative study from Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) 
dramatically revolutionised the direction of and outlook on Theory of Mind research, if not 
without controversy.  This study used a violation of expectancy paradigm to see whether 
15 month- old infants could identify a protagonist’s inappropriate action based on a false 
belief.  They were shown a video of an actor placing a piece of watermelon into a box and 
then later retrieving it.  In the false belief condition, the watermelon moved from the 
original location to a different box whilst the actor was not looking.  They found that 
infants looked longer when they saw the actor reach for the new (actual) location than the 
original location, suggesting that they expected the actor to reach to the (incorrect) location 
where she believed the object to be.  Further research has even found that children seem to 
track the mental states of a protagonist who has no direct influence on the scene.  Kovacs 
et al. (2010) presented 7- month-old infants with a video showing a ball rolling into view 
and then behind an occluder.  In the false belief condition, a smurf-like character was 
present during this first stage and then moved off-screen.  While the smurf was absent, the 
infant then saw the ball move out from behind the occluder and roll off-screen.  When the 
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smurf returned, the occluder was removed to reveal an empty space and infants’ gaze 
duration to the location was measured.  Results showed that infants looked longer in this 
condition than in a baseline where both infant and smurf believed the ball to be absent 
from behind the occluder.  The same result was found in the condition where the infant had 
a false belief themselves.  This suggests that infants at this age automatically track an 
agent’s belief, even when they are not directly acting upon the scene and even when the 
protagonist’s belief conflicts with the infant’s. 
These results are critically important for the debate surrounding children’s joint action 
capabilities.  If they are to be taken at face value, then they provide good evidence that 
infants can track mental states and therefore potentially process the intentions of a partner 
in a joint action scenario.  However, there are still reasons to doubt whether the abilities 
demonstrated in these tasks are of the same quality as those required in a joint action task. 
Apperly and Butterfill (2009) argue that the type of belief tracking being measured in these 
types of ‘implicit’ tasks is qualitatively different to that being measured in traditional 
‘explicit’ false belief tasks.  They present a ‘two-systems theory’, whereby infants initially 
only have an implicit system for tracking mental states, which is efficient and automatic, but 
inflexible.  They then develop a second system (at around 4 years) which is more 
cognitively demanding, but allows flexibility in mental state processing.  This system runs 
in parallel to the earlier developing implicit system.  Evidence for this theory comes from 
both adult and developmental literature.  Firstly, research into adults shows that although 
mental state tracking is often automatic and undemanding on cognitive resources, in other 
circumstances it is effortful and prone to error.  Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino and 
Samson (2006) found evidence that adults do not always process belief states automatically.  
When presented with scenarios in which a protagonist held a false belief about the location 
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of an object and then asked an incidental question regarding this belief and also reality, 
participants made more errors for the belief than reality.  This contrasted with a condition in 
which participants were explicitly asked to track the belief, suggesting that in some 
circumstances adults will not automatically track beliefs unless overtly instructed to do so.  
However, other work has also found evidence that adults sometimes do automatically track 
mental states.  Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite and Andrews (2010) presented adults with a 
scene in which a number of dots was visible.  An avatar was also present in the scene, which 
could see either the same number of dots as the participant, or a different number (due to 
some being hidden by a wall). Participants were slower to judge the number of dots they 
could see in the array when the avatar had a different perspective to them, suggesting that 
their self-perspective judgements were influenced by the differing perspective of the avatar.  
Thus, it is logical to argue that there is an implicit system which automatically and 
efficiently tracks mental states, but only in some circumstances.  The explicit system, on the 
other hand, is cognitively demanding but is also flexible and transferable between different 
circumstances.  Developmental studies are also compatible with this theory.  Even children 
who fail explicit false belief tasks have been shown to betray an implicit understanding 
through looking behaviours.  For example, Ruffman, Granham, Import and Connolly (2001) 
found that 3-year-olds would often give the incorrect response regarding the falsely believed 
location of an object, but simultaneously look to the correct location.  Furthermore, they 
included a betting measure, where children were asked to bet counters based on how 
confident they were in their responses.  Children consistently made confident bets based on 
their explicit answers, demonstrating their ignorance to the implicit knowledge betrayed 
through their eye gaze.  This evidence fits with the theory that the implicit system is 
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inaccessible, providing support for the possibility that there may be two separate systems 
involved in mental state tracking, one which is explicit and accessible and one which is not. 
This provides a further possibility for joint action development.  If it is sufficient to 
have an implicit understanding of mental states in order to perform joint actions, then even 
very young infants should theoretically have the capacity to do so.  However, if it is 
necessary to have an explicit understanding of mental states then we should only expect 
joint action to occur later, coinciding with the age at which children explicit theory of mind 
tasks at around 4 years.  Given the complexity of the scenarios outlined by Bratman (1992) 
and Butterfill and Sebanz (2011), it seems perhaps more likely that the latter is true.  
However, both possibilities require further investigation. 
1.3 Early Development of Executive Functions 
Now that the relevance of Theory of Mind in joint action development has been 
proposed, it is important to highlight one other higher level cognitive capacity that may play 
a further role.  Executive function is the term used to describe a range of cognitive skills that 
develop across early childhood.  There are variations in what type of skills are included in 
this definition, but they typically include inhibitory control, task shifting and working 
memory updating as a basis (Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzi & Howerter, 2000).  This 
set of abilities is hugely important for everyday behavioural control and as such, it is 
reasonable to assume that this would also apply to successfully coordinating actions with 
others.  Further, there are specific reasons for thinking that certain elements of executive 
control might be highly relevant for such activities. The following paragraphs will outline 
how such elements develop in early childhood and how each might impact upon joint action 
performance. 
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Inhibitory control is a key component of Executive Function and one that is particularly 
salient when observing young children’s behaviour.  It is the term used to describe the 
ability to ignore irrelevant stimuli in order to focus attention on those that are relevant to the 
task in hand.  This form of self-control can involve inhibiting external stimuli (for example, 
shutting out background classroom noise in order to focus on playing a game with a peer) or 
internal impulses (for example, suppressing the urge to steal another child’s toy in order to 
avoid punishment from the teacher).  As these examples illustrate, inhibitory control is 
extremely difficult for young children.  Tasks that measure inhibitory control in children are 
usually designed to measure accuracy or response latencies to a desired stimulus when a 
competing stimulus is present.  For example, ‘go-nogo’ tasks involve pressing a computer 
button when one type of stimulus appears on the screen but avoiding pressing the button 
when another type is present (e.g.the Bear/Dragon task, Kochanska, Murray, Jacques, 
Koenig & Vandergeest, 1996).  Similarly, tasks can involve responding to one stimulus 
feature but ignoring a competing feature of the same stimulus (e.g. Simon task, Simon 
&Wolf, 1963).  Other types of inhibitory control task involve measuring the amount of time 
a child can resist succumbing to an impulse to perform an action, such as eating a sweet if 
resisting eating it would result in a greater reward (Mischel, Shoda & Rodriguez, 1989) or 
inhibiting peeking whilst a gift is wrapped (Kochanska et al., 1996).  Finally, some tasks 
involve controlling a motor impulse, usually by slowing down movements or reducing 
volume of speaking (e.g. Walk-a-Line Slowly, Whisper task (Kochanska et al, 1996)). 
The role of inhibitory control in joint action participation may be more or less important 
depending on the type of actions that are required to be carried out by each participant.  In 
joint activities where both participants are required to carry out identical actions, for 
example lifting a box together, there does not seem to be much cause for inhibiting any 
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representation they might have of the other’s intention or action (although inhibition could 
be necessary for behaviour control in general).  In fact, in such scenarios, copying or 
mirroring the other’s actions is likely to result in more efficient performance, therefore 
inhibition may actually be detrimental.  However, joint actions frequently involve 
complementary actions to be carried out by each participant, which are different from one 
another or even opposite.  For example, when performing a piece of music with a melody 
and a harmony, two singers must perform different actions in unison whilst simultaneously 
keeping sufficient track of what the other singer is doing to ensure coordination.  In such 
scenarios, any tendency to mirror a partner’s action would cause detrimental interference.  
Given existing evidence on mirror neurons (Di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & 
Rizzolatti, 1992) and joint action co-representation (Sebanz et al., 2003), it is clear that such 
interference does occur.  It is thus highly likely that inhibitory control is required in order to 
overcome the interfering influence of a partner’s actions in circumstances where 
complementary actions are necessary. 
Task shifting or switching is another key component of Executive Functions, which 
involves switching from following one rule to following another during a task.  This ability 
is typically measured using tasks featuring alternative rules about which stimulus to respond 
to and switching between rules either halfway through the task or on intermittent trials (e.g. 
Standard Dimensional Change Card Sort, Frye, Zelazo & Palfai, 1995). 
Task switching may also play a role in joint action performance, particularly in tasks 
where participants are required to take turns rather than perform actions simultaneously.  
For example, if children play football together, they may take it in turns to be in goal.  In 
order to perform one’s own action/task role appropriately in both of these alternating roles 
(goalkeeper and goal scorer), it is necessary to switch between the two tasks, updating and 
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avoiding interference from the alternative role each time there is a switch.  Research using 
tasks where participants are required to play complementary roles shows that they make 
more errors when required to make two sequential ‘Go’ actions rather than a ‘Nogo’ 
followed by a ‘Go’ action, suggesting that they expect to take equal turns with their partner 
(Liepelt, Wenke, Fischer & Prinz, 2011).  Greater switching ability in such tasks may aid 
performance, particularly when switching does not occur in a predictable pattern.  This 
relationship between interference caused by a partner and switching capacity may also be 
bidirectional, in that influence from a partner may later aid participants to switch to that 
action themselves.  For example, in the football example, participants may have an 
advantage at getting the ball past the goalkeeper if they have previously had experience of 
being the goalkeeper themselves.  In other words, the experience of having represented or 
simulated a partner’s action may help future performance on that action. 
Working memory is the final domain of executive function that will be considered here. 
Working memory involves retaining relevant information in memory whilst carrying out a 
task and updating memory given new incoming information (see Carlson, 2010 for a 
variety of typical working memory tasks used with young children).  Working memory has 
a clear implication for successful completion of any task where participants must follow a 
rule.  In order to complete the task, the participant must consistently retain the task rule in 
mind in order to maintain or adjust her actions to achieve a goal.  This applies equally if 
not even more so to joint actions.  In these cases, both/all participants must retain their own 
task rule and inhibit influence from others.  Thus, it follows that individuals with higher 
working memory capacity may be better able to complete a joint action, as a stronger 
memory representation for one’s own rule may be advantageous in avoiding interference 
from other rules.  However, it is vital that participants are selective in their memory 
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representations, as stronger memory for all task rules may still result in considerable 
interference if inhibition is poor. 
Returning to the original question of whether children have the pre-requisite skills to 
perform adult-like joint action, evidence in this domain suggests that children have great 
difficulty with all three of these Executive Function skills (Inhibitory Control, Task 
Switching and Working Memory) at the Pre-School age (see Carlson, 2010 for a review 
of performance on Executive Function tasks over development).  All of these executive 
capacities are important to consider when studying joint action, due to the potential roles 
they may play in individuals’ abilities to act jointly with a partner.  However, it is possible 
and even likely that these capacities have only a mediating influence on joint action 
mechanisms, rather than being intrinsically linked to joint action cognition specifically.  
Thus it is important to ensure that any paradigms that are devised to measure joint action 
feature appropriate controls for the influence of executive capacities of children.  For 
example, it is vital that poor performance on a joint action task cannot be explained simply 
by children being unable to process the executive requirements of the task, such as memory 
for instructions. 
The previous two sections have highlighted the current status of research on children’s 
early cognitive abilities in two domains: Theory of Mind and Executive Functions.  In terms 
of Theory of Mind, it is unclear whether the types of abilities that children demonstrate very 
early in development are qualitatively sufficient to explain the apparently cooperative joint 
action behaviours that can be seen around 2 years of age.  On the one hand, implicit tasks 
suggest some level of belief tracking even in the first year of life, which could arguably be 
adequate for joint action understanding.  On the other hand, the requirements laid out by 
Bratman (1992) and Butterfill and Sebanz (2011) seem to suggest a more complex and 
18 
 
explicit understanding of the goals and intentions of a partner.  This highlights the necessity 
of further investigating the mechanisms underlying early joint action behaviours in order to 
determine what level of social cognitive processing is required in order to participate in these 
types of activities. 
In terms of Executive Functions, existing evidence suggests that children have great 
difficulty with the types of behavioural control that might be necessary in joint 
activities. This is relevant if further investigation into joint action mechanisms is to be 
carried out, because it is important that children’s skills are not underestimated due to 
the executive requirements of the task. 
Now that various factors have been outlined that are likely to be involved in development 
of joint action, it is necessary to return to the question of whether the behaviours we see at an 
early age can be defined as genuine joint action in the same way as we can describe adult 
behaviours involving intention understanding (Bratman, 1992).  In order to do this it is 
necessary to identify a way in which we can compare the behaviours we see in adults with 
those we see in children.  One way of doing this is to take a phenomenon that is seen in 
adults which demonstrates a representation of a task partner and to see whether children also 
show this phenomenon.  If they do so, this is evidence that children’s joint action is 
comparable to adults in that they form mental representations (of mental states, actions or 
otherwise, see discussion of representation types in Chapters 1 and 3) of their partner during 
a task.  Although this cannot directly solve the problem of whether children’s joint action 
fulfils Bratman’s criteria, it can provide a way of directly comparing adult and child joint 
action in terms of underlying mechanisms rather than overt behaviour.  Once this has been 
established, the path can be opened up to more detailed investigation of the level of 
processing that underlies these mechanisms. 
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1.4 The Social Simon Effect 
One phenomenon that has been meticulously investigated in the adult literature is the 
Social Simon Effect.  This is a phenomenon whereby adult participants demonstrate 
interference from a partner performing complementary actions in a joint task, compared to 
an identical solo version.  Social Simon tasks are based on modified versions of the Simon 
task (Simon & Wolf, 1963), which is typically used as a test of inhibitory control capacity.  
There are many versions of the Simon task, but the key component is the presence of a 
feature of the target stimulus that interferes with processing of the target feature.  For 
example, participants may be asked to respond to the direction in which arrows presented on 
a computer screen are facing.  However, they experience interference from the side of the 
screen on which the arrows are presented, so that left-facing arrows presented on the left 
side of the screen elicit faster responses than left arrows on the right side of the screen.  
Sebanz et al. (2003) found that when this task is performed as a Go-Nogo task, with 
participants only responding to one response option (e.g. left-facing arrows), this 
compatibility effect no longer occurs.  However, when participants perform the same task as 
a pair, compatibility effects return.  This is surprising, because in terms of each individual’s 
task, the requirements are identical to the solo Go-Nogo version.  Participants are still only 
required to process one response option and ignore the other.  Sebanz and colleagues argued 
that the reason for these effects is that participants ‘co-represent’ when working with a 
partner on a task.  In other words, simply having another person present and acting upon the 
alternative response option causes individuals to represent the other’s task in a similar way 
to how they represent their own task.  This is even more surprising given the fact that 
participants are not explicitly told to work together on the task, but rather they seem to 
automatically form social representations in a potentially interactive context. 
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If the co-representation account of the Social Simon Effect is true, then this 
phenomenon can be taken as evidence that individuals can form mental representations of a 
partner when performing a joint task.  Therefore, if children also show Social Simon 
interference effects, then we can argue that they are capable of adult-like social 
representations to some degree. This can then provide insights into the behaviours that can 
be observed in young children, which up until now have been difficult to explain. 
However, one potential problem with this reasoning is that there have been several 
criticisms of the Co-Representation Account of the Social Simon Effect.  The main 
criticism comes from Dolk and colleagues, who argue that the Social Simon Effect is 
caused, not by social representations, but by referential coding of the alternative response 
option.  In other words, the actions of a partner (i.e. pressing a button alongside 
presentation of certain stimuli) draw attention to the alternative spatial response and cause 
individuals to spatially code their own responses, which they do not do when this referent is 
not present in the solo Go-Nogo version of the task.  Evidence for this account comes from 
experiments which have shown that the Social Simon Effect can be induced by non-social 
stimuli such as a metronome which beats at the same time as a partner would do in an 
original Social Simon task (Dolk, Hommel, Prinz & Liepelt, 2013).  This clearly suggests 
that such effects are not social in nature and therefore demonstrating the phenomenon in 
children would not tell us anything about the involvement of social representation in joint 
action.  However, there are reasons to doubt this alternative account and therefore maintain 
justification for implementing co-representation tasks with children. 
Several studies cast doubt on the Referential Coding Account by demonstrating the 
pertinence of social manipulations in Social Simon paradigms.  Atmaca, Sebanz and 
Knoblich (2011) asked participants to take part in a joint flanker task.  The original 
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Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) involves responding to a visual stimulus 
that is flanked on either side by irrelevant, potentially competing stimuli (e.g. HHCHH, 
with ‘C’ being the target).  For example, in the individual binary choice version of the 
task, participants may be asked to respond to a central letter ‘H’ or ‘K’ with a right button 
press and a central letter ‘C’ or ‘S’ with a left button press.  The general finding is that 
individuals respond more slowly when the letters flanking the central target letters are 
assigned to an incompatible response option than the target (i.e. HHCHH) than when the 
flankers are neutral (i.e. UUCUU) or assigned to the same response option (i.e. SSCSS).  
In the joint version of this task, Atmaca and colleagues asked participants to perform this 
task as a pair, so that one individual responded to ‘H’s and ‘K’s and the other responded to 
‘C’s and ‘S’s.  They found a significantly greater flanker effect in the joint condition than 
in an individual Go-Nogo condition (where one participant responds to only one response 
set, e.g. ‘H’ and ‘K’), suggesting individuals represented their partner’s task rule.  More 
importantly, they also carried out these tasks under different social manipulations.  Firstly, 
they repeated the task, but this time instructing participants that they were playing 
alongside another participant in a different room.  In actual fact, there was no other 
participant in the task, but participants were led to believe they were taking part in a joint 
task.  Results showed a similar difference between individual and joint conditions as in the 
original experiment, with participants showing a larger flanker effect in the joint condition 
than the individual.  This result was only for participants who completed the individual 
task first, followed by the joint task.  However, the authors point out that this is likely to 
be due to participants who carried out the joint task first continuing to represent a ‘partner’ 
even once they have been told they are playing alone. This is strong evidence that social 
factors are highly relevant for the Social Simon effect. Additionally, and even more 
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convincingly, Atmaca et al. carried out a further experiment in which the intentionality of 
a partner was manipulated by introducing a mechanism that forced them to respond (a 
magnet that pulls the finger down to press a button) versus a condition where the partner 
was able to control their actions.  Again, compatibility effects were stronger when 
partners’ actions were intentional as opposed to forced.  This not only suggests that social 
representations are necessary for Social Simon effects to occur, but specifically that 
intentionality understanding plays an important role. 
Further evidence for the role of intentionality understanding in Social Simon effects 
comes from Tsai, Kuo, Hung and Tzeng (2008), who instructed participants to perform tasks 
either with a (believed) human partner in another room or with a computer programme. 
Results showed a compatibility effect in response times when participants believed they 
were playing alongside a human but not with a computer.  Further, electrophysiological data 
showed the same selective compatibility effect in the human partner condition but not in the 
computer partner condition.  Additionally, Humphreys and Bedford (2011) tested patients 
who had been shown to have deficits in Theory of Mind (on a non-verbal false belief task) 
on Social Simon task.  They found no behavioural effect of compatibility either in patients 
with posterior parietal cortex lesions or with patients with frontal lesions, suggesting that 
Theory of Mind (and in this case belief-reasoning specifically) is necessary for participants 
to form a joint representation of a task and therefore suffer interference from another’s task.  
All of these findings are highly relevant for the current investigation, as if co-representation 
involves intentionality understanding or even belief reasoning, then this should certainly 
satisfy Bratman’s definition of joint action.  Thus, there is a good basis for employing these 
types of tasks in an investigation of children’s joint action abilities. 
Having provided a justification for selecting this phenomenon to investigate children’s 
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joint action capabilities, it is necessary to outline some of the issues surrounding the Co-
representation Account and specifically the nature of the representations that are proposed to 
form in such interactions.  The original Co-representation Account suggested that participants 
form representations of the partner’s task rule.  In other words, participants form an overall 
representation of what the partner should do given a specific rule.  However, Wenke, Atmaca, 
Höllander, Liepelt, Baess and Prinz (2011) argue that this may not be the only or the most 
important mechanism involved in Social Simon interference.  They argue instead for an Actor 
Co-representation Account, which specifies that individuals in a joint scenario experience 
interference from a partner due to problems with self-other discrimination leading to 
confusion over whose turn it is to act.  Thus, rather than forming a detailed representation of 
the two (or more) separate task rules, including what actions are required for each rule, they 
simply form representations of when it is each participant’s turn to act.  So, Participant A 
represents that it is her turn when she sees right-facing arrows, but it is Participant B’s turn 
when she sees left-facing arrows.  There is, however, no representation of what Participant B 
should do when she encounters her target stimuli.  Likewise, it is possible that once the 
instructions have been processed by the participant and they understand that the task is split 
between the pair in a given way, they do not necessarily need to continue to monitor the 
other’s responses throughout the task.  In this way, Wenke and colleagues argue that Social 
Simon tasks may be less ‘joint’ than originally described, in that action planning and 
performance may not require iteration of joint mechanisms throughout the task. 
Evidence for this account comes from a series of experiments that feature binary response 
options.  In these experiments, each participant has not one, but two possible responses 
depending on the stimulus that is presented.  This type of design was used to identify whether 
response conflict from another’s task depends on the specific responses that are activated.  If 
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so, then this would provide evidence for the Task Co-Representation account.  If conflict is 
not dependent on specific responses but only whether a partner responds or not, then this 
would be evidence for the Actor Co-Representation account.  Three experiments in Wenke et 
al. (2011) failed to find any compatibility effects specific to a partner’s stimulus-response 
mappings.  For example, in Experiment 1, two participants sat facing one another with a 
display of three coloured discs in front of them.  The central disc was the target and the two 
discs on either side were the irrelevant flankers.  Participants each had a right and left-side 
response button which was assigned to a different coloured disc.  For example, Participant A 
had to respond to blue (left button) and red (right button) discs and Participant B had to 
respond to yellow (left button) and green (right button) discs.  Each participant encountered 
intra-individual trials, in which flanker discs were of the other colour assigned to said 
participant (for example, blue target and red flankers for Participant A) and inter-individual 
trials, in which flankers were of one of the colours assigned to their partner (for example, 
blue target and green flankers for Participant A).  If participants represent a partner’s 
specific stimulus-response mappings, they should show better performance in inter-
individual trials when the colour of the flanker is assigned to the same response as the target.  
For example, if the target is blue (left button response from Participant A) then responses 
should be faster if flanked by yellow discs (left response Participant B) than green (right 
response Participant B). Alternatively, the opposite could be true if participants represent 
mappings from an allocentric perspective.  However, Wenke et al. found no effect of 
compatibility in either direction in the inter-individual condition, suggesting that participants 
do not represent the exact stimulus-response mappings of their partner.  However, they did 
find a general effect of inter- versus intra-individual conditions, whereby participants were 
faster when the target was flanked by ‘own’ colours than ‘other’ colours.  This suggests that 
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participants form representations about whose turn it is to act, rather than exactly what the 
other person’s actions should be.  Although the authors agree that care must be taken when 
making conclusions from null results, they argue that given the consistency of these null 
findings they should not be dismissed when drawing conclusions about representations in 
joint action. 
Similarly, Atkinson, Simpson, Skarratt and Cole (2014) carried out a series of 
experiments which undermine the role of a specific action representation as opposed to 
task rule or goal representation.  They looked at Inhibition of Return (IOR), which is the 
phenomenon that individuals take longer to respond to a location in trial N when they 
previously responded to that location in trial N-1.  Welsh, Elliot, Anson, Dhillon, Weeks, 
Lyons and Chua (2005) had previously investigated this effect in a joint task setting and 
found that an individual’s responses to trial N were also slower if their partner responded 
to the location in trial N-1, suggesting co-representation of the partner.  Atkinson et al. 
(2014) followed on from this by varying the perceptual features of the response stimuli or 
alternatively the nature of the action towards the stimulus (i.e. pointing or reaching).  They 
found that the former led to modulation of IOR effects, suggesting that the perceptual 
features of the stimuli are key to co-representation.  However, varying the nature of the 
action had no modulating effect on IOR, suggesting that the action itself is not represented. 
However, some researchers argue that individuals performing a joint task can represent 
the actions of their partner, rather than the overall task rule.  Ondobaka, de Lange, 
Newman- Norlund, Wiemers and Bekkering (2012) found that participants’ responses 
showed interference effects in a joint card-selection task based not only on compatibility 
with a partner’s goal (i.e. congruent versus incongruent intention to select a high or low 
card) but also movement (i.e. congruent versus incongruent intention to make a left or 
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right-hand response).  They use this as evidence that individuals are capable of representing 
others’ movements as well as their goals, depending on the circumstances (in this 
experiment, compatibility effects for movement were only found when goals were 
congruent). 
The debate surrounding what is represented in co-representation is highly pertinent and 
worth further investigation.  However, for the sake of the current research question, it is not 
yet necessary to decide which of the accounts is correct.  Rather, it provides an interesting 
further question for future study in children and something to be conscious of whilst 
designing paradigms for use in early development.  Whether children form representations 
of specific stimulus-response mappings or expectations of turn-taking may moderate the 
conclusions that are made about the extent to which joint mechanism are activated 
throughout a joint task.  However, here we want to investigate whether children actually 
form representations during joint tasks at all, regardless of the nature of such representations. 
2.   Summary 
This General Introduction has outlined a gap in literature on early joint action abilities 
in children.  Although research has shown that children can participate in activities with a 
partner, it is unclear the extent to which they have an understanding of the joint nature of 
the tasks they are taking part in and what the mechanisms are that underlie these 
behaviours. This is further complicated by a difference in opinion amongst researchers 
about what constitutes a genuine joint action, particularly in terms of whether individuals in 
a joint scenario require intention understanding in order to show a true comprehension of 
the task (Bratman, 1992).  Although some researchers would argue that young children are 
capable of such social understanding (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005) and therefore have the 
capacity to perform genuine joint action (Carpenter, 2009) others would argue that we need 
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to redefine what has been termed joint action in early development in order to account for 
limitations in cognitive ability at this age (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009).  Such limitations 
may also apply to non-social cognitive skills, such as Executive Function capacity.  In order 
to investigate this directly, this thesis takes the approach of selecting an adult phenomenon 
that tells us about the representations formed during joint activities and applying this to 
children.  If children perform as adults do, and show interference effects that signify 
automatic representation of a partner when performing a task together, then we can argue 
that children are capable of forming social representations in joint action that are like 
adults’.  Additionally, given the evidence that such effects in adults are dependent on 
intentionality understanding, similar effects in children would be a step towards fulfilling 
Bratman’s (1992) criteria for joint action, even at an early age. 
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CHAPTER 2:  EXPERIMENTS 1-3 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CO-REPRESENTATION EFFECTS IN A JOINT TASK: DO 
CHILDREN REPRESENT A CO-ACTOR? 
 
Presented in its published format 
 
 
Milward, S., Kita, S. & Apperly, I. A. (2014).  The development of co-representation effects 
in a joint task: Do children represent a co-actor?  Cognition, 132, 269-279. 
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CHAPTER 3:  EXPERIMENT 4 
WHAT FORM DO JOINT REPRESENTATIONS TAKE?  AN INVESTIGATION 
OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF ‘WE-REPRESENTATIONS’ 
 
 
1.   Introduction 
The Social Simon Effect is a well-established phenomenon in adults and co- 
representation is a well-supported interpretation of this phenomenon.  However, controversy 
still surrounds how these representations of a task partner should be described and 
explained. As was discussed in the General Introduction to this thesis, questions have been 
raised as to whether the nature of effects are social or not (Dolk et al., 2013), whether they 
involve representations of the partner’s actions or task and what is the role of expectations of 
turn- taking (Wenke et al., 2011).  One interesting point of discussion is whether the 
representations involved in a joint task are actually qualitatively different than the addition 
of a self-representation and a representation of the other person.  In other words, perhaps the 
nature of a joint task representation actually involves a single representation of what ‘we’ 
are doing, rather than two representations of what ‘I’ and ‘you’ are doing which may 
interfere with one another.  The following will outline several theories that touch on the idea 
that there may be a stage of shared representations in development, or in fact that such 
representations are present throughout development and are only activated during interactive 
activities.  Each of these theories gives a different prediction for children’s development of 
such representations.  This will be discussed with a view to introducing the current study, 
which was designed to investigate the nature of representations within the age group at 
which co- representation was found in Chapter 2 (4-5 years). 
Vygotsky (1978)’s classic theory of the Zone of Proximal Development specifies 
that children only learn about the world through interactions with others, who aid 
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children in gaining knowledge that would be unattainable on their own.  He argues that 
children first take part in actions with a more able partner and then internalise these 
abilities so that they can become part of the child’s individual repertoire.  For example, 
if a child attempts to reach for an object this is likely to result in a parent interpreting 
this as a communicative gesture and thus passing the object to the child.  This starts out 
as a reflex action in the child, but is gradually internalised so that the child understands 
the communicative impact of the action it performed.  Hence, a pointing gesture evolves 
and can be used by the child to indirectly obtain items via a caregiver.  As such, children 
gain mastery of mediating processes such as tool and sign use that develop from more 
basic processes and are shaped through social interaction.  This theory highlights the 
importance of a stage of interaction which leads to later mastery of actions by oneself. 
Tomasello and colleagues have built on this idea, forming their theory of shared 
intentionality (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne & Moll, 2005; Tomasello & 
Rakoczy, 2003).  They argue that children initially have certain individualistic 
cognitive skills, such as gaze following, social manipulation, group activity and social 
learning (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007), which are then built upon through the 
development of shared intentionality at around 1-2 years old.  Thus, skills that start out 
as individual in nature become understood as shared with others.  For example, group 
activities below the age of 1-2 years are similar to those displayed by non-human 
primates, in that behaviours can be co-ordinated in a group (such as group hunting in 
chimpanzees) but do not involve understanding of the shared goals of the group.  
Instead, co-ordination occurs due to individuals reacting to the behaviour of others with 
the individual intention of achieving a personal goal.  It is only once shared 
intentionality develops that children understand that the group activity involves all 
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participants sharing a goal or intention (Hamann et al., 2012).  Tomasello and 
colleagues argue that this is what makes humans different from other species and thus 
able to develop such sophisticated cultures and societies. 
Other theories have not only underlined the importance of dyadic or collective 
interactions for development, but have also specified the direction of learning between 
individuals.  Simulation Theory, for example, assumes that understanding of others’ 
mental states comes from understanding of one’s own mind, which is then projected onto 
the other person (Gordon, 1986).  Individuals use external information about the 
experience of others to generate a simulation of what they themselves would think or feel 
if they were in that situation.  Thus, it is knowledge of oneself that allows understanding of 
others.  This fits with extensive evidence that both children and adults make egocentric 
errors in perspective-taking (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956; Borke, 1975; Keysar, Lin & Barr, 
2003), as it seems reasonable that if individuals apply knowledge of themselves to others, 
they are likely to make errors if others have different knowledge or experience than 
themselves. 
Specifically, Meltzoff (2007) outlines a ‘like me’ framework for simulation.  He argues 
that understanding of self-other similarities is the foundation of social cognition.  Thus, 
children initially experience a close relation between action and perception, through 
imitative acts where the child’s own action matches the action they perceive in another 
individual (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977).  They then experience the mental states that are 
associated with the action they are performing, such as happiness when imitating a smile.  
Only then can they map these personal experiences onto the other person, to understand that 
when they are smiling, they are also likely to be experiencing happiness ‘like me’.  
Importantly, he also argues that this relation is bi-directional, so that while children can 
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estimate others’ mental states by comparing their external actions to the child’s own actions, 
they can also learn about the consequences of to-be-performed actions by observing others 
perform them first.  It is unclear from this theory whether the starting point, when action and 
perception overlap, involves self-other distinction or whether perception and production of 
action are united in a single representation.  Either way, individual representations of self 
and other are achieved at some point in development, which enables mapping from one to 
the other. 
A further theory of social cognition that starkly contrasts with Simulation and ‘like me’ 
theories is Prinz’s (2012) Open Minds theory.   He, instead, proposes a ‘like-you’ 
framework, whereby individuals develop understanding of themselves only through 
understanding of others.  He argues that embodied mirroring processes allow children to see 
themselves from the outside (much like physical mirrors) and thus understand their own 
actions from an external perspective.  For example, a parent imitating a child’s facial 
expressions provides the child with an image of what their expressions look like from the 
outside, which they can then associate with the physical sensations of motor processes they 
experience internally.  Thus, children first understand others as agents in control of their 
actions and then apply that knowledge to their own self when they see their actions mirrored 
in others. 
Although these two theories differ in terms of the directionality of learning between self 
and other, they both agree that representations of self and other are separate, and as such can 
develop at different times, one leading on from the other.  However, there are reasons to 
think that interactive activities may involve qualitatively different representations and 
mechanisms from those involved in understanding ‘self’ and ‘other’ in isolation.  Such joint 
activities may provide us with additional information or opportunities for learning than non-
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interactive activities.  For example, some research on joint decision-making suggests that 
problem- solving efforts are more productive in a group than as an individual, beyond merely 
an additive value.   Bahrami, Olsen, Latham, Roepstorff, Rees and Frith (2010) asked pairs 
of participants to make individual perceptual judgements about visual information on a 
screen. 
If participants’ responses did not match within a pair, they were required to discuss their 
response and make a joint decision.  They found that pairs were more accurate when 
working together than the best participant of the pair when working alone (although only 
when partners were permitted to communicate their confidence in their answers to one 
another). Additionally, 3-6 year-old children have been shown to perform better on a toy-
building task when they had previously completed the task in a cooperative, turn-taking 
manner with the Experimenter than when they had previously completed the task with each 
individual completing all steps alone (Sommerville & Hammond, 2007).  These types of 
studies provide evidence that there are differences and often benefits of working in an 
interaction over and above working alone, for both adults and children. 
Interactionist theories have highlighted the importance of considering the qualities of 
social interactions between individuals rather than studying individual processing of social 
scenarios in isolation.  Gallagher (2011) argues for a strict form of Interactionism which 
focuses on the low level embodied processes that occur between actors in an interaction, 
such as those based on the Mirror Neuron System (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992).  Gallagher 
argues that understanding others’ mental states does not involve any kind of mentalizing 
processes, as suggested by traditional accounts (e.g. Simulation Theory: Gordon, 1986; 
Theory Theory: Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997).  Rather, he argues that mental state 
understanding involves extracting information from the embodied processes involved in 
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interactions (such as entrained movements where actors automatically synchronise their 
movements with one another) which provide external cues about emotions and intentions. 
Importantly, he states that these shared processes are unique to interactions and do not exist 
in non-interactive situations.  Thus, the whole of all participants in an interaction is other 
than the sum of their parts (Koffka, 1935).  Michael (2011) takes a more inclusive 
standpoint, arguing for a version of interactionism that does not exclude the presence of 
mentalizing abilities alongside embodied processes.  He argues that embodied processes can 
actually contribute to mentalizing about another’s mental states, in that an individual can 
notice the responses they make in an interaction, based on low-level embodied mechanisms 
and interpret them using higher level mechanisms in order to understand the other person 
through the qualities of that interaction.  In this way, it is the product of the interaction that 
provides the information necessary to read the mind of a partner. 
Gallotti and Frith (2013) recently drew on these existing approaches to specify a 
modified version of interactionist theories of social cognition.  They argue for what they 
term a ‘we- mode’, into which individuals enter when they are taking part in an interaction.  
As such, certain mechanisms are present in the individual that are only activated in 
circumstances where there is social interaction or even merely the suggestion of potential 
social interaction. Evidence for this ‘we-mode’ comes from studies showing co-
representation of a partner in joint tasks, even when individuals are not specifically 
instructed to take note of their partner’s task or actions (Sebanz et al., 2003).  More 
specifically, a phenomenon known as the GROOP effect demonstrates the importance of 
group context on actors’ imitative behaviours.  When a single actor was asked to imitate the 
finger-tapping movements of two hands on a screen, mimicry increased when the hands on 
the screen belonged to a single individual rather than from two individuals (even though 
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participants always saw one right and one left hand.  This was also the case for two 
participants imitating hands from two individuals (optimized mimicry) as opposed to from 
one individual, showing that the group context in which actors are required to act affects 
how they process task stimuli in imitation (Tsai, Sebanz & Knoblich, 2011).  This suggests 
that when acting in a group, individuals make representations of the task at the group level, 
rather than at the individual level.  In other words, I represent what ‘we’ are doing, rather 
than simply what ‘I’ am doing. 
This last theory of ‘we’ representations brings up a number of developmental questions. 
Several of the theories of mindreading highlighted here have involved some specification of 
an overlap in self versus other representations at some point in development.  Meltzoff’s 
‘like me’ framework stipulates an initial stage of imitation where perception and production 
of action overlap.  Although it is not clear what kind of representation or representations this 
involves, it is possible that this could involve something similar to the ‘we’ representations 
described by Gallotti and Frith (2013).  If this is the case, this theory would imply a 
development from ‘we-mode’ to self-other distinction later in development.  This would fit 
with evidence that children only develop self-other distinction around the second year of life 
(Amsterdam, 1972) and that self-other distinction is related to cooperative abilities in joint 
action tasks (Brownell & Carriger, 1990).  Similarly, Prinz’s (2013) theory also argues for a 
stage of action-perception overlap, caused by embodied mirroring processes that occur 
during interactions. This then leads to self-other distinction, but in this case the direction of 
learning goes in the opposite direction, from ‘other’ to ‘self.  However, both of these theories 
put less emphasis on this initial stage of self-other overlap as being a way of forming joint 
representations to aid cooperation and more on its role as a route to learning about oneself or 
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another.  Thus, it is unclear whether this initial stage of overlap would fall into the ‘we-
mode’ category as outlined by Gallotti and Frith (2013). 
The Interactionist arguments outlined above, however, provide a clearer example of the 
relevance and distinctiveness of joint representations, explicitly stating that they are unique 
to interactions rather than being present solely in the mind of the individual.  However, these 
theories do not make predictions about how such representations might change over 
development.  Given that embodied mirroring processes can be seen in even very young 
children (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977), one might expect that the types of joint mechanisms 
described by stricter Interactionists (Gallagher, 2011) are present and stable throughout 
development.  However, if we take Michael’s (2011) version of Interactionism which 
includes a role of higher level processes, we should expect more of a developmental curve 
depending on general cognitive capacity. 
The experiments from Chapter 2 (Milward, Kita & Apperly, 2014) demonstrate that co- 
representation of a partner occurs by at least 4 years old.  However, it is unclear whether 
such representations fit the description of ‘we’ representations as outlined by Gallotti and 
Frith (2013) or whether children are actually forming two separate representations of ‘self’ 
and ‘other’ which interfere with one another but are not encoded at a group level.  Different 
theories make different predictions about the nature of these representations.  Simulation 
Theories and the ‘like me’ framework do not make explicit predictions about whether the 
initial stages of interactions (i.e. when action perception and production overlap through 
imitation or mirror processes) consist of single or dual representations.  Investigating this 
would help to describe these stages in more detail.  Interactionist theories that only allow for 
low-level embodied processes would predict qualitatively different mechanisms in 
interactive contexts throughout development, as long as mirror processes are established.  
37 
 
Michael’s (2011) modified version of Interactionism would predict some change in type of 
representation over childhood, due to the role of higher level mechanisms that use embodied 
processes as input for mindreading.  This could perhaps see a change to dual representations 
of ‘self’ and ‘other’ when such higher level mechanisms are mediating interactions, in 
contrast to single ‘we-mode’ representations when only low level mechanisms are operating. 
In theory, these could both continue into development, so that even adults with greater 
cognitive capacity may enter into ‘we-mode’ in certain circumstances.  Such a prediction 
would be in line with a two-systems account of Theory of Mind (Apperly & Butterfill, 
2009), by which both low and high level mindreading systems are in place from the early 
years and into adulthood. 
The current study investigated whether 4-5 year-olds’s co-representation of a task partner 
involves ‘we’ representations or separate ‘self’ and ‘other’ representations.  The method built 
on the paradigm employed in Experiment 3 of Chapter 2, which featured a computerised 
version of the Go-Nogo Bear Duck task where children either followed the same task rule as 
their partner (Same condition) or the opposite rule (Different condition). Additionally, it 
included the switching element that was used in Experiment 2 to control for confusion 
accounts of Task effects.  Thus, each participant took part in a Pre-switch phase followed by a 
Post-switch phase in which they were required to switch to the alternative task rule.  In 
Experiment 2 a switch cost was found in the Same condition but not in the Different 
condition, suggesting that forming a representation of one’s partner’s task in the Pre-switch 
phase gives participants an advantage when they are then asked to switch to that rule.  The 
present experiment also introduced a new factor in order to explore representation types in 
this paradigm.  This was the Experimenter Presence condition in which the Experimenter, 
playing the role of partner to the child, either stayed for the whole game or left after the 
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switch had been introduced.  The logic behind this manipulation was that if children 
represented the task at a group level in the Pre-switch phase, then the departure of their 
partner after the switch should eliminate any advantage of the Different condition.  In other 
words if the partner leaves, the task can no longer be represented at the group level (i.e. 
‘we’) and therefore should incur a cost of switching to the individual level.  However, if the 
Experimenter stays, the results of Experiment 2 should be replicated (i.e. switch cost in the 
Same condition but not in the Different condition). By including the Switch condition in the 
computerised paradigm, we also attempted to replicate the findings of Experiment 2 with a 
new paradigm. 
2.   Method 
2.1   Participants 
Participants were 106 4-5 year-olds (Mean age = 58.08 months, Range = 51-65 
months) from two Primary schools in the Birmingham area.  Two participants were 
excluded due to experimenter error and five for never responding on any trial.  Remaining 
participants (N = 99) participated in one of 4 conditions: Same Stay (n = 26); Same Leave 
(n = 26); Different Stay (n = 24); or Different Leave (n = 23). 
2.2   Stimuli 
Stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment 3 with the exception of a slight 
change to the EPrime programme design.  For this experiment, the game consisted of 2 
blocks of 12 trials. Each block was separated by a blank screen, during which the new 
instructions were presented.  An Observer was also present during this experiment, who 
remained seated behind the computer screen for the entire procedure. 
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2.3   Design and Procedure 
Children were brought to the testing area and introduced to the Observer as follows, 
‘This is Julia/Leila, she’s just going to help me load up some of the games.’  The practice 
stages followed, which were identical to Experiment 3, so that all children carried out a solo 
and then a joint practice.  The Experimenter then said, ‘Ok, let’s have a go at the real one 
now’, after which the Observer loaded up the first block of trials on the laptop.  The animal 
assigned to the child was counterbalanced across conditions, so that half had to spot the 
Duck first and half the Bear.  All examples given here are for children who were asked to 
spot the Duck in Block 1.  While the game was loading, the Experimenter asked children a 
comprehension question, ‘Can you just remind me when you had to press your button?  Was 
it when you saw the Duck or the Bear?’  Responses were recorded.  If children answered 
incorrectly, the Experimenter corrected them, ‘No, do you remember?  You have to press the 
button when you see the Duck’ All children then carried out Block 1 according to whether 
they had been assigned to a ‘Same’ or ‘Different’ condition.  Children in the Same condition 
were required to press their button on presentation of the same animal as the Experimenter, 
whereas those in the Different condition had to press it for the opposite animal.  Instructions 
were identical to Experiment 3 for this block.  On completion of the first block, the 
Experimenter gave neutral praise and then asked a second, identical, comprehension question 
and recorded responses, giving corrections where necessary.  She then presented the 
following instructions ‘Now we are going to do something different.  This time, your job is to 
spot the Bear.  So, whenever you see the Bear, you should press your button as fast as you 
can.   But, if you see the Duck, you shouldn’t press your button, you just stay still and don’t 
press anything at all.  Do you think you can do that?’  The remainder of the instructions were 
dependent on whether the participant was in the ‘Stay’ or ‘Leave’ condition.  For the Stay 
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condition, the Experimenter said, ‘Ok great, let’s have a go at that one then’.  For the Leave 
condition, the Experimenter said, ‘Ok great.  I just have to pop outside for a moment, do you 
think you can carry on without me?  I’ll be back soon.’ The Experimenter then left the room. 
For both Stay and Leave conditions, the Observer loaded up the next block of trials on the 
laptop.  For the Leave condition, she did this once the Experimenter had left the room. 
Participants then completed the second block of trials with the new rule, so that each child 
completed a Pre-switch and a Post-switch block.  Upon completion, the Experimenter 
returned to the room, gave neutral praise and then asked a final comprehension question. 
3.   Results and Discussion 
Results were analysed based on Score (overall proportion correct) and Response Times. 
Children’s accuracy (see Table 3.1) was above chance (50%) for all conditions (Same Stay: 
Pre-switch t(25) = 8.50, p < .001, post-switch t(25) = 12.11, p < .001; Same Leave: Pre- 
switch t(25) = 6.54, p < .001, post-switch t(25) = 6.08, p < .001; Different Stay: Pre-switch 
t(23) = 7.45, p < .001, post-switch t(23) = 6.07, p < .001; Different Leave: Pre-switch t(22) 
= 4.99, p < .001, post-switch t(22) = 4.14, p < .001).  Values were submitted to a mixed 
effect logistic regression, with Participant as a random effect, Task (Same or Different) and 
Experimenter Presence (Stay or Leave) as the between- participant fixed effects and Switch 
(Pre- or Post-switch) as the within-participant fixed effects (Intercept = 1.48 (SE = .38), 
estimated standard deviations for Participants = .74), which found no effect of Task (β = 
.10, SE β = .55, p = .85), Experimenter Presence (β = .23, SE β = .55, p = .68, or Switch (β 
= -.22, SE β = .21, p = .31) and no interactions (Task*Experimenter Presence: β = -.67, SE β 
= .79, p = .38; Task*Switch: β =.15, SE β = .31, p = .64; Experimenter Presence*Switch: β 
= -.10, SE β = .31, p = .73; Task*Experimenter Presence*Switch: β =.44, SE β = .43, p = 
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.30). Planned pairwise comparisons showed no effect of Task for pre-switch trials only (β = 
.12, SE β = .23, p = .60). 
Response times for correct (go-) responses were analysed.  Response times were 
removed if they were below 250ms.  Response times were recorded within a 1000ms window.  
Values (see Table 3.2) were submitted to a 2 (Same vs. Different) x 2 (Stay vs. Leave) x 2 
(Pre- vs. Post-switch) mixed ANOVA, in order to identify whether the predicted 
Task*Experimenter Presence*Switch interaction was present.  This found no significant effect 
of Task (F(1, 91) = 2.00, p = .16, partial eta squared = .03), Experimenter Presence(F(1, 91) = 
1.70, p = .20, partial eta squared = .02) or Switch (F(1, 91) = 2.16, p =.15, partial eta squared 
= .03).There were no significant interactions (Task*Experimenter Presence: F(1, 91) = .00, p 
= .97, partial eta squared = .00; Task*Switch: F(1, 91) = .06, p = .80, partial eta squared = 
.00; Experimenter Presence*Switch: F(1, 91) =.11, p = .75, partial eta squared = .00; 
Task*Experimenter Presence*Switch: F(1, 91) = .01, p = .94, partial eta squared = .00). 
Planned pairwise comparisons showed were carried out in order to identify whether the effect 
of task (Same versus Different) from Experiments 1 and 2 could be replicated in the pre-
switch phase of this experiment.  However, there was no effect of Task for pre-switch trials 
Table 3.1. 
   
Mean (SD) proportion for correct responses on Same/Different and Stay/Leave 
Task conditions for Pre- and Post-switch blocks. 
      
 Pre-switch Post-switch 
      
   
Same Stay   .78 (.17) .82 (.13) 
Same Leave   .75 (.19) .76 (.22) 
Different Stay   .74 (.16) .70 (.16) 
Different Leave   .72 (.21) .69 (.22) 
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only (t (88) = 1.52, p = .13, Cohen’s D = .32). 
4.   General Discussion 
This experiment failed to find the Task*Switch*Experimenter Presence interaction that 
was predicted if children form ‘we’ representations of the task at a group level.  However, the 
fact that this experiment also failed to find a Task*Switch interaction or an effect of Task for 
pre-switch trials makes it impossible to form conclusions based on the absence of this 
interaction.  If the aforementioned effects had been found, then the absence of an interaction 
might have indicated that joint task representations at this age are dual in nature, in that they 
consist of separate representations of self and other.  If this were true, we would expect to find 
a switch cost in the Same but not the Different condition regardless of whether the 
Experimenter was present in the post-switch phase.  In other words, having represented ‘me’ 
versus ‘you’ in the pre-switch phase, I can still benefit from having previously represented 
‘you’ when I then have to switch to ‘your’ task in the post-switch phase.  This would not be 
the case if I had represented ‘our’ task in the pre-switch phase, as the absence of of my partner 
means the post-switch phase is represented as a totally different, solo task.  However, this 
Table 3.2. 
   
Mean (SD) response times (ms) for correct responses on Same/Different and 
Stay/Leave Task conditions for Pre- and Post-switch blocks. 
      
 Pre-switch Post-switch 
      
   
Same Stay 772.34 (133.70) 759.62 (112.07) 
Same Leave 749.63 (119.08) 742.84 (116.29) 
Different Stay 804.75 (138.89) 780.13 (124.31) 
Different Leave 753.70 (135.64) 748.55 (119.16) 
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experiment’s failure to replicate effects of co-representation makes it impossible to draw 
conclusions about such representations. 
It is possible that this is simply due to an insuffiency in sensitivity of the task to these 
effects.  Given that the Switch condition has never been implemented with the computerised 
version of the Bear Duck task, this is certainly possible.  Additionally, in the current 
experiment fewer trials were administered (two blocks of 12 trials rather than three blocks 
in Experiment 3).  Given that both experiments had a similar sample size (Experiment 3, N 
= 94; Experiment 4, N = 99) it is possible that the current experiment lacked the power of 
Experiment 3. 
Another likely possiblity is that a difference in methodology could have hidden effects 
that were present in this experiment.  Whereas in Milward et al. (2014) responses were 
recorded even after the stimulus had disappeared from the screen (after 1000ms), an error in 
the current study resulted in these late responses only being recorded for pre-switch trials.  
Therefore, for all participants, only responses that were made while the stimulus was on the 
screen, within a 1000ms time frame, could be analysed in the overall ANOVA.  Given the 
distribution of scores, it is highly likely that responses were made after this cut-off point. This 
is clear from looking at pre-switch responses including this window from 1000-2000ms (see 
Table 3.3).  74 out of 103 participants (4 participants were added to this analysis who had 
previously been excluded for not responding in the 1000ms time frame) made at least one 
response within this later time period, with a total of 82 responses being made overall. Correct 
responses were re-analysed including correct responses made after 1000ms in an independent 
samples t-test.  However, even with these data there was still no significant effect of Task 
Type (t (96) = -1.31, p = .19).  Likewise, no significant main effect of Task Type was found 
for accuracy when including this additional data (t (97) = -1.64, p = .11). Nonetheless, it is 
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Table 3.3. 
Mean (SD) accuracy and response times (ms) for correct responses on 
Same/Different and Stay/Leave Task conditions for the Pre-switch block, including 
1000-2000ms time window. 
 
 
 
     Accuracy                              Response Times 
 
 
 
Same Stay 
 
 
.89 (.18) 
 
 
882.64 (190.72) 
Same Leave .84 (.18) 861.87 (204.615) 
Different Stay .91 (.13) 975.23 (212.48) 
Different Leave .86 (.24) 930.66 (216.00) 
 
 
possible that had these data also been available for the post-switch trials, there might have 
been an interaction with Experimenter Presence.  Therefore, it would be fruitful to repeat this 
experiment with a longer response recording time frame in order to identify whether any 
effects were hidden in the current data. 
Another improvement that could be made to this task in the future is to increase the 
sensitivity of the dependent measures.  Although Response Times have been shown to be 
informative in this task (Milward et al., 2014), this is a measure that can cause problems 
when testing a young population due to the variation in their responses and easy 
distractability.  A more sensitive measure might help to overcome these problems.  From 
observing children whilst participating in the task, one can see that they often make hand 
movements towards the response buttons but manage to resist their impulse before they 
actually press the button.  The fact that this information was not recorded means that a lot 
of informative data was lost.  Further experiments that could record these ‘half-responses’ 
would be very valuable, particularly for this type of task that produces relatively small 
effect sizes.  ‘Half-responses’ could be measured using video recording or motion tracking 
technology. 
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A further possibility is that the ‘Experimenter Presence’ manipulation is not appropriate 
for testing the presence of ‘we’ representations.  It is possible that once a certain type of task 
representation has been formed, it does not change as long as the task continues.  For 
example, if participants form a ‘we’ representation on hearing the task rules, but do not then 
continue to monitor the responses of their partner, they may not be affected by their partner 
leaving (Wenke et al., 2011).  Given the evidence that individuals can represent a partner’s 
task even when they are not in the same room (Atmaca et al., 2011; Tsai et al., 2008), it is 
reasonable to argue that a representation involving the other person could remain active even 
when they are no longer present.  One solution to this problem would be to modify an existing 
paradigm that has been used to investigate ‘we’ representations in adults, such as the GROOP 
effect (Tsai et al., 2011), and modify this for children.  Although this task has the 
disadvantage that it has not yet been used with children and therefore may take some time to 
develop, it has the advantage that it has been shown to be effective in measuring 
representation type, which the current paradigm has not. 
Although this failure to replicate findings from Milward et al. (2014) should not be 
ignored, they should also not necessarily cast doubt on the three previous experiments that 
have found solid effects in line with the Co-representation Account.  For reasons stated 
above, there is a high possibility that methodological differences may have made effects 
more difficult to uncover in the current experiment.    Further, the question of the nature of 
representations is still highly relevant to current research and efforts should be made to 
investigate this further.  One possibility would be to run this experiment again, but making 
alterations based on the issues referred to above. 
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CHAPTER 4:  STUDY 5 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN CHILDREN’S CO- REPRESENTATION.  
THE ROLE OF THEORY OF MIND, INHIBITORY CONTROL AND 
WORKING MEMORY 
 
1.   Introduction 
Results from the Chapter 2 (Experiments 1-3) provide evidence for a possible cut-off 
point in development where co-representation effects do not occur.  As already 
discussed, this cut-off point needs further investigation in order to ensure that the lower-
bound cannot be pushed down using different tasks.  However, it is intriguing to consider 
the possibility that this is a set stage during which co-representation develops.  If this is 
the case, it is pertinent to ask what other cognitive skills may be involved in this onset, 
particularly as this period (4-5 years) has been shown to be an important stage of 
development for various abilities.  This chapter will discuss the potential role of three 
cognitive skills on co-representation, all of which show considerable development at 
around this age.  The skills are Theory of Mind, Inhibitory Control and Working 
Memory, each of which will be addressed in a separate section.  This is with a view to 
presenting an individual differences study to measure these roles empirically. 
1.1. Theory of Mind 
As outlined in the General Introduction, Theory of Mind undergoes a major stage of 
development around the age of 4 years, when children are able to pass false belief tasks 
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983).  The fact that this age coincides with the age at which co- 
representation has been found in this thesis is worth further investigation.  Co-
representation researchers have already discussed the involvement of mental state 
understanding for co- representation and have carried out studies that have provided some 
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support for a link between the two.  Humphreys and Bedford (2011) found that patients 
with lesions associated with Theory of Mind deficits did not show spatial compatibility 
effects in a joint Simon task whereas they did so in an individual version.  These patients 
showed deficits on measures of false belief understanding, suggesting not only that Theory 
of Mind but specifically belief comprehension is necessary for co-representation. 
Other studies looking at mental state understanding and the Social Simon effect have 
focussed on intention understanding as a pre-requisite for co-representation.  Tsai et al. 
(2008) found behavioural and electrophysiological effects of compatibility when 
participants were told they were performing a Simon task with a human partner, but not 
when told they were playing alongside a computer.  Likewise, using a joint Flanker task, 
Atmaca et al. (2011) found that participants only showed compatibility effects in a joint task 
when their partner’s actions were intentional rather than when they were controlled by a 
magnet. Although these tasks suggest a role of mental states in co- representation, they do 
not specify anything as arguably complicated as belief processing. 
Intentions are plans that an individual makes to perform a certain action in order to 
achieve a goal.  Intention understanding has been argued to develop much earlier than belief 
understanding, at around 1-2 years old (Tomasello et al., 2005).  Tomasello and colleagues 
argue that at this age infants can understand that an individual is animate and their actions 
are self-produced (Woodward, 1998), that individuals have goals and that they can choose an 
action plan accordingly (Gergely, Bekkering & Kiraly, 2002).  It is these three capacities that 
enable infants to understand intentions, the final stage of which was shown at 14 months by 
Gergely et al. (2002).  In fact, Bratman’s definition of joint action specifically determines 
intention understanding as a pre-requisite for genuine comprehension.  Therefore, if 
intention understanding develops so early, it cannot explain why co-representation has been 
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found to develop only around 4 years.  Either intentionality is not the only requirement for 
co- representation, or co-representation should be found at an earlier age. 
However, one possibility is that understanding of an individual’s intentions is not enough 
in a joint action context. Instead, there may need to be some shared representation of joint 
goals or intentions.  Tomasello et al. (2005) argue that shared intentionality is what separates 
humans from other species.  This involves not only understanding another individual’s goals 
and intentions, but understanding them in context alongside one’s own goals and intentions 
and co-ordinating with one another to build a joint action plan to achieve a joint goal. 
However, Tomasello and colleagues argue that this shared intentionality is not an additional 
step in development, but rather it develops in stages alongside development of individual 
intention understanding via humans’ intrinsic motivation to share psychological states.  This 
means that when infants develop the ability to understand another person’s choice of plan in 
the pursuit of a goal, they also develop the ability to collaborate interactively with that 
person and understand joint goals and intentions.  Thus, this does not help to explain the 
difference in developmental onset of intention understanding and co-representation. 
One further reason for doubting the role of Theory of Mind as a developmental pre- 
requisite for co-representation is that implicit tasks have shown belief-tracking capacity from 
as early as 7 months (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; see General Introduction for literature 
review).  Given that the Bear Duck tasks used in this thesis do not involve any explicit 
instructions to track the partner’s mental states or even actions, their requirements seem 
more similar to the implicit violation of expectancy paradigms that have found early belief 
tracking than to the false belief paradigms that have found understanding at around 4 years. 
Thus, various sources suggest the level of mental state understanding that has been 
suggested to be necessary for co-representation is already present much earlier than the age 
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at which the studies presented here have found such effects.  However, the results from these 
studies remain controversial.  Many researchers would argue that this evidence of early 
Theory of Mind could be explained through simpler mechanisms than mental state 
representation (see Low & Perner, 2012).  Likewise, it has been argued that the behaviours 
seen in implicit belief tracking paradigms demonstrate a different type of cognitive ability to 
that which is elicited by explicit false belief paradigms (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). 
Further, research has not yet outlined how these early ‘implicit’ behaviours might be related 
to other cognitive skills, such as language and executive functions.  In contrast, explicit 
paradigms have been extensively investigated in relation to such skills (Milligan et al., 2007; 
Sabbagh et al., 2006) providing a basis for making predictions about how they might relate 
to co- representation.  Given these arguments alongside existing evidence for the role of 
belief reasoning in co-representation (Humphreys & Bedford, 2011) and the age at which co- 
representation has been suggested to develop, the rational next step is to investigate the role 
of mindreading and other cognitive skills that develop around this age. 
1.2 Inhibitory Control 
Inhibitory control clearly plays an important role in the Simon task, both in individual 
and joint versions.  The original Simon task is often used as a measure of inhibitory control, 
with participants with greater capacity being better able to resist the interfering spatial 
stimulus- response link and therefore make fewer errors and faster responses.  Likewise, in 
joint versions of the task, the presence of the other person causes this interference to return 
(arguably due to co-representation) and thus inhibition is required again to resist responding 
to it. In the Bear Duck tasks employed here, both tasks involve playing alongside a partner. 
However, the Same task should not require inhibiting the other person’s task/action 
(although inhibition is required in general to complete the task), because there is no 
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competition between participants’ responses.  If anything, inhibiting one’s partner should slow 
responses. In contrast, the Different task should require inhibition to resist interference from 
the partner’s (different) task.  Therefore, it is possible that individual differences in 
performance on the Different task could be modulated, not only by the level to which a person 
co- represents a partner, but by their capacity for inhibiting the representation of the other 
person in order to avoid interference. 
1.3 Working Memory 
Working memory is also necessary for both individual and joint Simon tasks. 
Participants must remember their task rule and maintain this whilst completing the task.  If 
they are to co-represent, they also need to remember the other person’s task rule, particularly 
in version of the task where participants cannot see each other.  This is likely to be highly 
important in real world joint action scenarios, which often require adaptation of actions in 
order to co-ordinate with a partner.  In order to do this it is necessary to understand the 
partner’s role in the task.  It is vital to further investigate the role of Working Memory in the 
current paradigm, given the potential issue of memory for task rules that have been 
discussed in previous chapters.  One possible explanation for the task effects in Experiments 
1 and 2 was that participants benefitted from hearing instructions twice in the Same 
condition as opposed to the Different condition, where the two sets of instructions issued to 
each participant were different from each other.  This was dealt with in Experiment 3 by 
presenting the partner’s (in this case Experimenter’s) role as a statement rather than an 
instruction.  However, it is still possible that this statement could have aided memory for 
the participants’ own task in the Same condition.  By identifying the role of working 
memory in both conditions in the current study, direct evidence can be obtained as to 
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whether working memory has a confounding influence on the tasks implemented in this 
thesis. 
1.4 Individual Differences 
Each of these cognitive skills has been subject to extensive investigation in terms of 
individual differences in children’s abilities and how these differences relate to other 
cognitive constructs as well as real world outcomes.  Relations between measures of 
Executive Function were outlined in the General Introduction, with findings pointing to the 
existence of an overall umbrella construct (‘Executive Function’) which covers individual 
domain-specific constructs (e.g. Inhibitory Control, Working Memory and Set Shifting). 
Accordingly, tasks within a single domain (e.g. Inhibitory Control) should correlate 
strongly with one another, but should also show weaker correlations with tasks from other 
domains (e.g. between Inhibitory Control and Working Memory).  Executive Function has 
also been investigated in terms of its relation to Theory of Mind, with findings suggesting a 
significant relationship between the two (Sabbagh et al., 2006; Carlson, Moses & Breton, 
2002).  Thus, children with more developed executive functions skills also tend to show 
greater Theory of Mind ability.  Although the exact nature of this relationship is 
controversial (see Moses, 2001), the relevant point for the current discussion is that a 
relationship exists that accounts for shared variance in individual performance on tasks 
measuring these different skills.  Co- representation, in contrast, has not yet been 
investigated in terms of its relationship with other cognitive skills.  The question of which 
capacities might be involved in co-representation is particularly pertinent when looking at 
children’s behaviour, as it can help to explain the developmental trajectory that we see in 
early co-representation tasks.  For this reason, the following experiment investigates the 
relationship between individual differences in Working Memory, Inhibitory Control, 
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Theory of Mind and co-representation.  Specifically, it focuses on which cognitive skills 
predict individual performance on the computerised co- representation task from previous 
experiments in this thesis.  The three cognitive constructs were chosen based on the 
rationale outlined in the preceding sections. 
In order to increase validity of the measures used, multiple tasks were administered 
for each cognitive construct.  Tasks were taken from existing studies that have looked at 
individual differences in Executive Functions and Theory of Mind that have used a 
similar age range to that in the current study.  Working Memory was measured using 
Backward Digit Span and Counting and Labelling tasks, based on Carlson et al. (2002).  
Inhibitory Control was measured using Day Night (Gerstadt, Hong & Diamond,1994) and 
Pictures tasks (Burns, Riggs & Beck, 2012). The Day Night task was converted into a 
computer task in order to measure response times as well as accuracy. 
Since the relationship between Theory of Mind and development of co-representation has 
not yet been studied, it is not clear which type of mental state representation might be 
involved.  For this reason, a scale made up of three tasks was implemented in this study.  
This was based on Wellman and Liu’s (2004)’s Theory of Mind scale, which was originally 
made up of five tasks.  They produced a scale using Rasch analyses, whereby tasks were set 
in an order from easy to difficult with the expectation that children passing a given task 
should also pass all tasks preceding it in the scale.  The final scale consisted of the following 
tasks: Diverse Desire, Diverse Belief, Knowledge Access, Contents False Belief, Real-
Apparent Emotion.  Given that the age group used in our study was at the top end of the 
sample used in Wellman and Liu (2004), the three tasks at the top end of the original scale 
were selected for the current measure of Theory of Mind.  This was with the intention that 
tasks could be first combined to create a composite Theory of Mind score, adding power to 
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overall analyses, as well as being broken down into separate Theory of Mind tasks if overall 
analyses produced a significant effect. 
Additionally, age and receptive vocabulary were measured as control variables, in 
order to ensure that variance in individual performance was not due to more general 
abilities or development, rather than a specific relation to the constructs of interest.  For 
example, Executive Function and Theory of Mind may improve with age in a similar way 
to co- representation, but this does not signify a relationship between the two.  Likewise, 
improvements in language ability may incur variance in performance on all tasks, simply 
because they involve verbal instructions.  Controlling for these variables makes 
conclusions regarding target relationships easier to draw. 
2.   Method 
2.1 Participants 
Participants were 115 4-5 year-olds (Mean age = 61.68 months, Range = 48-69 months) 
sampled from Birmingham’s Think Tank Science Museum (n = 30), two Primary schools in 
the Birmingham area (n = 18) and three from the Northamptonshire area (n = 67). Two 
participants from Northamptonshire schools failed to complete all tasks and were excluded 
from analyses.  All other participants carried out all tasks and all conditions of each task in 
a within-subjects design. 
2.2 Design and Procedure 
Children were tested in a separate room, quiet corridor area or reading corner of the 
schools.  Tasks were divided into two 15-20 minute sessions, in order to give children a rest 
between blocks.  Depending on school classroom routines, there was a period of a 
minimum of 1 hour to a maximum of 20 hours between completing the first block and 
starting the second session of tasks.  Tasks consisted of one co-representation measure 
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(CR) three Theory of Mind measures (ToM), two Working Memory measures (WM), two 
Inhibitory Control measures (IC) and the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS).  Tasks 
were administered in a fixed order, so that individual differences in performance between 
participants cannot be due to order effects.  Session 1: Bear/Duck (CR); Knowledge Access 
(ToM); Contents False Belief (ToM); Real-Apparent Emotion (ToM); Backward Digit 
Span (WM).  Session 2: Day Night Stroop (IC); Counting and Labelling (WM); Pictures 
(IC); BPVS. 
2.3 Measures 
2.3.1 Receptive Vocabulary Measure 
The British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS II: Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Burley, 1997) 
was fully administered to all children.  Children worked through a booklet featuring four 
pictures per page.  For each page the Experimenter articulated a word and the child was 
required to point to the correct picture that corresponded to the word.  Responses were 
recorded as correct or incorrect.  Pages were divided into sections and children were tested 
to failure upon scoring 8 or more errors within one section.  A total raw score was calculated 
based on the number of the last item tested before failure minus the total errors made over 
all sections.   
 
2.3.2 Working Memory Measures 
Backward Digit Span.  The methodology for this task was taken from Carlson et al. 
(2002).  Children were introduced to a puppet called Ernie and told, ‘Ernie is being very 
silly. Everything I say, he says backwards!  Like this, if I say the numbers “1, 2” he says “2, 
1”!  Do you think you can do what Ernie has done and say things backwards?’. Participants 
then had a two-digit practice trial, on which they were corrected if they got the answer 
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wrong, followed by three test trials with 2, 3 and 4 digits respectively.  Participants obtained 
a score out of four. 
Counting and Labelling. The methodology for this task was taken from Carlson et al. 
(2002).  Children were presented with three toys (a bike, a pineapple and an elephant).  The 
Experimenter said, ‘We are going to play a game now.  I am going to show you what to do 
and then it will be your turn.  I am going to do three things.  First I am going to count all of 
my toys, ‘one, two, three.’  The Experimenter points to each toy as she counts.  ‘Second I 
am going to name all of my toys.  Bike, pineapple, elephant’ (pointing as she labels).  ‘Third 
I am going to count and then name my toys together.  One is a bike, two is a pineapple, 
three is an elephant.  Now, here are some more toys’.  Experimenter places three new toys 
(a lamp, a suitcase and a banana) in front of the child.  ‘Can you do the same as I have 
done?  First can you count them?’  Experimenter waits for child to count and corrects if 
necessary.  ‘Second can you name them?’  Experimenter waits and corrects if necessary.  
‘Third can you count and then name them together?’  The Experimenter does not correct on 
this final test trial. This is then repeated for a further trial with new toys (a pig, a tractor and 
a strawberry). Children are scored as correct if they get all of the items in the correct order 
for each of the two test trials, giving a total out of two. 
2.3.3 Inhibitory Control Measures 
Day Night Stroop.  This task was adapted from the classic Day Night Stroop task 
(Gerstadt et al., 1994).  The original task required children to say the word ‘Day’ when 
presented with a picture of the moon and stars and ‘Night’ when presented the sun.  
However, here a computerised version of the task was developed which inverted the input 
and response required by the child.  Thus, children were required to press a button with a 
picture of the moon and stars on when they heard a recorded voice say the word ‘Day’ and to 
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press a button with a picture of the sun on when they heard ‘Night’.  This should produce 
similar inhibitory demands as the original task, whilst allowing not just accuracy but also 
response times to be recorded as dependent measures.  Participants completed four practice 
trials and 16 test trials. Trials commenced upon completion of the previous trial, giving no 
time limit on responses. 
Pictures task.  This task was identical to that used in Burns et al. (2012).  Children 
participated in a computer game in which they saw a picture of either a monkey or a cat 
appear on the screen.  They were required to press one of two buttons, one of which 
corresponded with the cat (and displayed a sticker with the same cat picture) and one with 
the monkey (displaying a monkey sticker).  These buttons were placed 20cm apart, with one 
on the left and one on the right hand side of the laptop screen.  Pictures on the computer 
were also displayed either on the left or right hand side, so that half of the trials (n = 10) 
were congruent with the side on which the corresponding animal button was situated and 
half were incongruent.  Participants completed a total of four practice and 20 test trials. 
2.3.4 Theory of Mind Measures 
Theory of Mind measures were taken from Wellman and Liu’s (2004) Theory of 
Mind scale. Only three of the original tasks from the five-task scale were employed, due 
to the smaller age range being tested here and the age-appropriateness of selected tasks. 
Knowledge Access.  Participants were shown a Lego drawer and asked, ‘What do you 
think is inside the drawer?’  The Experimenter then opened the drawer to reveal a plastic 
monkey, ‘Let’s see…Look, there’s really a monkey inside!’ She then closed the drawer, 
‘Ok, so what is in the drawer?’.  After the child’s response, the Experimenter said, ‘Polly has 
never seen inside this drawer.  Now here comes Polly.’ A plastic doll was then brought into 
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view.  The test question, ‘So, does Polly know what is in the drawer?’ was then asked, 
followed by the memory check question, ‘Did Polly see inside the drawer?’  In order to 
score correctly, children had to respond ‘No’ to both of these questions. 
Contents False Belief.  Children were presented with a plaster (‘Band-Aid’) box.  They 
were first asked, ‘What do you think is in the plaster box?’ after which the box was opened 
to reveal a toy pig, ‘Look, it’s really a pig inside!’  The box was then closed and the child 
was asked, ‘Ok, so what is in the plaster box?’ Once the child had answered, the 
Experimenter said, ‘Peter has never seen inside this plaster box.  Now here comes Peter.’  
A different plastic doll was then brought into view and the test question was asked, ‘So, 
what does Peter think is in the box, plasters or a pig?’  This was followed by the memory 
check question, ‘Did Peter see inside the box?’ Children had to respond ‘Plasters’ and 
‘No’ respectively in order to score correctly on this task. 
Real-Apparent Emotion.  Children were told a story about a boy who wanted to hide 
how he felt about an event.  In the story, another child had called the boy names, which had 
made him feel sad.  However, he tried to hide how he felt so that the other children would 
not think he was a baby (See Appendix E for full script).  Children were asked a memory 
check question, ‘How did the boy really feel when everyone laughed, did he feel happy, sad 
or ok?’ They were given a sheet with three faces on (one happy, one neutral and one sad) 
which they could point to in response.  They were then asked the test question, ‘How did he 
try to look on his face when everyone laughed, did he try to look happy sad or ok?  Children 
had to respond with a more negative emotion for the memory check question than for the 
test question in order to gain a score of 1. 
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2.3.5 Co-representation task. 
This task was modified from the computer task employed in Experiment 3 in order to 
make it suitable for use within-subjects.  The EPrime programme from Experiment 3 was 
altered to display two rather than three blocks of 12 Bear and Duck trials.  This was in 
order to allow an equal number of blocks before and after the switch.  A second EPrime 
programme was designed which had an identical structure to the first programme, but 
rather than presenting Bear and Duck stimuli, they presented pictures of a Pig and a 
Penguin (see Appendix F). This was so that representations of stimuli from the first 
(Same) task could not influence those in the second (Different) task and to aid children’s 
understanding of the different rules for each task.  Pilot data found an effect of Task Type 
(Same versus Different) in a within-subjects design only when the Same condition was 
presented first and the Different condition was presented second.  This is unlikely to have 
been caused solely by children getting tired or bored and thus declining in performance 
over time, because if this were the case then such a decline should also occur when the 
Same condition is presented second.  Therefore, it is argued here that order effects were 
caused by factors related to co-representation.  For this reason, tasks were presented in a 
fixed order with the Same condition first and then Different condition second.  Each child 
completed both conditions, with a different version of the EPrime programme (Bear/Duck 
or Pig/Penguin) for each condition. The order of presentation of each programme was 
counterbalanced so that half of the participants completed the Bear/Duck version in the 
Same condition and half in the Different condition, and likewise for the Pig/Penguin 
version.  Children completed the solo practice, joint practice and Same condition as in 
Experiment 3.  Once the Same condition had been completed, children were asked a 
comprehension question and then given the instructions for the Different condition, 
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(example given is for Same task with Bear as target, Different task with Pig as child’s 
target) ‘Now we’re going to do something different.  This time your job is to spot the Pig.  
So whenever you see the pig, you should press your button as fast as you can. But, if you 
see the Penguin, you shouldn’t press your button.  You just stay still and don’t press 
anything at all.  My job is to spot the Penguin.  So whenever I see the Penguin I’m going to 
press my button as fast as I can.  But, if I see the Pig, I’m not going to press my button, I’m 
just going to stay still and not press anything at all.’  A further joint practice was then 
administered using the new stimulus set and new rules.  The second EPrime programme 
was then loaded and children completed the Different condition, followed by a 
comprehension question. 
3. Results and Discussion 
Results will be presented in three stages.  First, results from each task will be 
summarised in relation to original expectations of performance based on previous literature.  
Composite measures will then be described and correlational analyses carried out to identify 
relations between all measures.  Lastly, regression analyses will be carried out in order to 
identify the contribution of factors to co-representation. 
3.1 Summary of task expectations 
Means and standard deviations for all tasks are presented in Table 4.1.  Results will be 
discussed below according to predictions made based on previous literature using these 
tasks. 
3.1.1 Receptive vocabulary. 
BPVS scores were in the average range (Dunn et al., 1997). 
3.1.2 Working Memory Measures. 
Backward Digit Span.  Mean performance (see Table 4.1) was slightly below that found in 
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 Table 4.1.  Descriptive statistics for all tasks   
 
Task  Mean score (Standard Deviation) 
Receptive Vocabulary  
          BPVS Raw Score 54.12 (11.24) 
 
Working Memory Accuracy  
 
 Backward Digit Span (0-4) 1.63 (1.40)       -      - 
 Counting and Labelling (0-2) 0.95 (.94)       -      - 
 Total (0-6) 2.59 (1.99)       -      - 
Inhibitory Control Accuracy     RTs 
 
    Correct RTs 
 
Pictures:  Congruent 94 (11) 1228.96 (197.59) 
1240.94(204.83) 
 
                Incongruent 90 (13) 1359.79 (213.75) 
1393.87(210.70) 
 
Day Night Stroop 86 (25) 1591.55 (294.79) 
1618.49(325.50) 
 
 
Total (combined composites): 
                 Correct 
                 Incorrect 
 
 
.15 (1.58) 
.04 (3.05) 
Theory of Mind Accuracy  
 
 Knowledge Access 82 (38)          -     - 
 Contents False Belief 57 (50)          -     - 
 Real Apparent Emotion 27 (45)          -     - 
 Total (0-3) 1.66 (.90)          -     - 
Co-representation Accuracy        RTs 
 
Correct RTs 
           Same task 85 (11)       720.69 (119.16) 727.32 (116.90) 
           Different task 
 
83 (13) 
 
747.23 (99.37) 
 
751.25 (101.30) 
 
 
Carlson et al. (2002) for four year-olds (Mean = 1.95, SD = .78) and five year-olds (Mean = 
2.88, SD = 1.02). 
Counting and Labelling. Mean performance (see Table 4.1) was slightly below that 
found in Carlson et al. (2002) for four year-olds (Mean = 1.44, SD = .81) and five year-olds 
(Mean = 1.69, SD = .60). 
3.1.3 Inhibitory Control Measures. 
Day Night Stroop.  Accuracy and Response Times (RTs) were recorded for this task. 
Responses with RTs below 250ms and above 3 standard deviations from the mean 
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(6335.77ms) were excluded.  Current participants showed higher accuracy (see Table 1) 
than children in Gerstadt et al. (1994) at age four (Mean = 68.8), four and a half (Mean = 
63.1) and five years (Mean = 78.1). This is likely to be due to children responding more 
quickly in Gerstadt et al. (1994) at age four (Mean = 1650ms), four and a half (Mean = 
1180ms) and five years (Mean = 1230ms).  In order to combine accuracy and RTs in a 
composite measure, values were converted into z scores and signs were reversed for RT z 
scores so that, as for accuracy, higher scores signified better performance.  Z scores for 
accuracy and RTs were then added together.  This was as an alternative to inverse efficiency 
scores, which are argued to be unsuitable for scores with error rates over 10% (Bruyer & 
Brysbaert, 2011). 
Pictures.  Accuracy and RTs were recorded for both Congruent and Incongruent conditions 
of this task.  Mean accuracy and correct RTs were descriptively better on Congruent than 
Incongruent trials (see Table 4.1) in line with predictions made based on Burns et al. (2012).  
This difference was significant using paired samples t-tests (Accuracy: t (111) = -3.28, p = 
.001; Correct RTs: t (111) = 9.58, p < .001).  Speed-accuracy scores were then created in the 
same way as for the Day Night Stroop.  In order to create a total score for the Pictures task, 
the composite score for the Incongruent condition was regressed onto that for the Congruent 
condition and from this, residuals were calculated for the expected score on Incongruent 
trials given the score on the Congruent trials.  This calculation was used as an alternative to 
subtraction efficiency scores, where the control condition is subtracted from the 
experimental condition in order to produce a difference score.  Based on DeGutis, Wilmer, 
Mercado and Cohan (2013), it is argued that this is a superior method of calculating the 
variance of an experimental condition whilst controlling for shared variance with a control 
condition, as it statistically removes this shared variance.  In contrast, by subtracting a 
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control condition from an experimental condition, the resulting difference score will still 
correlate with the control condition as it retains shared variance with this measure.  In this 
case, variance that is unique to the Incongruent condition is the most interesting, as it is in 
this condition that inhibition is required, unlike in Congruent trials. 
3.1.4 Theory of Mind scale. 
Relative performance on each of the Theory of Mind tasks (see Table 1) was as 
expected based on Wellman and Liu (2004).  Overall performance on Knowledge Access 
was greater than Contents False Belief (t (112) = 5.50, p < .001) and Real Apparent 
Emotion (t (112) = 10.02, p < .001) and Contents False Belief was greater than Real 
Apparent Emotion (t (112) = 4.99, p < .001). 
3.1.5 Co-representation. 
Accuracy and RTs were recorded for Same and Different conditions.  There was a 
descriptive difference between the two conditions for both Accuracy and RTs (see Table 1). 
Paired samples t-tests highlighted a significant difference between conditions for correct 
RTs (t (107) = -2.56, p = .01) but not for accuracy (t (111) = 1.66, p = .10).  This replicates 
the effect of Task Type in RTs in a previous version of this task (Experiment 3 in Milward 
et al. 2014) which found a between-subjects difference in Task type, and pilot data which 
found a within-subjects difference.    In order to create a composite score for co-
representation, RT and accuracy values for each condition were converted into z scores and 
combined within each condition to create a speed-accuracy composite.  Next, residuals were 
calculated in the same way as for the Pictures task, by regressing the Different task 
composite onto the Same task composite.  In this case, variance that is unique to the 
Different condition is the most interesting, as it is in this condition that co-representation is 
expected to show an effect of conflict with a partner, as opposed to the Same condition. 
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3.2 Correlations 
First, where there were multiple tasks within a single domain (Working Memory, 
Inhibitory Control and Theory of Mind), task means were entered into Spearman’s Rank 
correlational analyses.  Mean totals for Backward Digit Span and Counting and Labelling 
correlated significantly (r (113) = .42, p < .001) and were therefore combined to create an 
overall Working Memory score.  Mean totals for Day Night Stroop and Pictures Residual 
Score did not correlate (r (111) = .02, p = .83).  For this reason, further analyses included 
both a total Inhibition score (by adding Day Night Stroop composite and Pictures Residual 
Score) as well as each of the individual Inhibition measures independently.  Of the three 
Theory of Mind tasks, only Knowledge Access and Contents False Belief correlated 
significantly (r (111) = .39, p < .001).  For this reason, the three Theory of Mind tasks were 
analysed separately as well as including a total Theory of Mind score by adding all three 
task scores. 
3.2.1 Age and Receptive Vocabulary Correlations 
An overall Spearman’s Rank correlation matrix can be seen in Table 4.2.  Age in months 
correlated with Receptive Vocabulary, Working Memory Total and Day Night Composite.  
Receptive Vocabulary correlated with all three Theory of Mind, Theory of Mind Total, 
Working Memory Total, Day Night Composite and Co-representation. This is consistent with 
existing literature demonstrating the development of Working Memory, Inhibition and Theory 
of Mind at this age (Carlson, 2010; Carlson et al., 2002), as well as the role of language and 
the importance of controlling for this in experimental studies (Milligan et al., 2007). 
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Table 4.2. 
R values for correlations between Age, Receptive Vocabulary, Theory of Mind, Working Memory, Inhibition and Co-representation 
       
 
Age 
(months) 
BPVS Raw 
Score 
Knowledge 
Access 
Contents 
False Belief 
Real Apparent 
Emotion 
Theory of 
Mind Total 
Working 
Memory Total 
Day Night 
Composite 
Pictures 
Residual 
Inhibition 
Total 
Co-representation 
Residual 
Age(months) - -.30** .10 .13 .08 .14 .46** .19* .01 .16 -.02 
BPVS Raw Score  - .26** .35** .22* .40** .47** .26** -.12 .11 .20* 
 
Theory of Mind 
Knowledge Access   - .39** .03 .62** .33** .06 -.10 -.01 .18 
Contents False Belief    - .14 .81** .35** .20* -.06 -.10 .18 
Real Apparent 
Emotion     - .57** .12 .07 .11 .17 .17 
Total      - .38* .17 -.00 .14     .25** 
 
Working Memory  
Total       - .39** -.11 .27**   .21* 
 
Inhibition 
Day Night Composite        - .02 .81**    .32** 
Pictures Residual         - .55** -.08 
Total          - .21* 
 
Co-representation 
Co-representation 
Residual           - 
Note: *p < .05 **p < .01 
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3.2.2 Executive Function and Theory of Mind Correlations 
Working Memory Total and Inhibition Total correlated with each other significantly (r 
(107) = .27, p = .005).  This correlation was weaker than that found between the two 
Working Memory measures (r (113) = .42, p < .001), which is in line with Miyake et al. 
(2000)’s prediction that Executive function measures should correlate with one another, but 
more strongly between measures of the same type of Executive component.  However, 
Inhibition measures in this task did not correlate with one another.  This was unexpected, 
given that they are both conflict inhibition tasks, where participants are required to inhibit a 
conflicting stimulus in order to respond to a target.  However, the Day Night task in this 
study did not feature congruent trials as a control measure, whereas the Pictures task did so.  
Therefore, the composite scores for each task are slightly different, in that the Day Night 
composite does not control for factors that may be involved in performance beyond 
inhibitory control. Additionally, whereas the Day Night composite is determined by a 
participant’s ability to retain in mind and act upon a rule that conflicts with a prepotent 
response, the Pictures task measures ability to switch between inhibiting a prepotent response 
on incongruent trials whilst acting consistently with it on congruent trials.  Further, the 
competing element in the Pictures task is spatial, whereas the Day Night is conceptual.  In 
conclusion, there are reasons to explain the lack of correlation here, although it was 
unexpected given previous findings that within domain executive function tasks are 
correlated (Miyake et al., 2000). 
Two of the Theory of Mind measures correlated with Working Memory total (Knowledge 
Access: r (111) = .33, p < .001; Contents False Belief: r (111) = .35, p < .001). Contents 
False Belief correlated with Day Night Composite (r (111) = .20, p = .04.  These results 
remained similar once Age in months and Receptive Vocabulary had been partialled out 
66 
 
(significant correlations between Working Memory total and Knowledge Access (r (104) = 
.25, p = .01) and Contents False Belief (r (104) = .34, p < .001) and between Pictures 
Residual Score and Real Apparent Emotion (r (104) = .21, p = .03)).  This is in contrast to 
Carlson et al. (2002)’s finding that Inhibition, but not Working Memory correlates with 
Theory of Mind. It is possible that these different results are due to differences in task.  
However, the Contents False Belief task used here made up part of Carlson et al.’s Theory of 
Mind measure, Inhibition tasks were of the same type (Conflict Inhibition) in both studies and 
the Working Memory measures employed here were identical to two of the three used by 
Carlson et al. Again, it is possible that the lack of correlation with inhibitory measures is due 
to the differences in task type outlined above. 
3.2.3 Co-representation and cognitive measures 
The Co-representation Residual Score correlated with Theory of Mind Total (r (106) = 
.25, p < .01), Working Memory Total (r (106) = .21, p = .03), Day Night Composite (r (106) 
= .32, p = .001) and Inhibition Total (r (101) = .21, p = .03).  Regression analyses were 
carried out in order to identify which relationships remained significant predictors once other 
variables were entered into the same model. 
3.3 Regression analyses 
The Co-representation Residual Score was used as the final dependent variable, given 
that it has been shown to be a good measure of the experimental condition whilst controlling 
for variance explained by the control condition (DeGutis et al., 2013).  A multiple linear 
regression was carried out with Co-representation Residual Score as the dependent variable 
and Age in months, BPVS raw score, Inhibition Total, Working Memory Total and Theory 
of Mind Total as the predictor variables in a single model.  The overall model was significant 
(F (5, 97) = 3.63, p = .005) with Inhibition Total and Theory of Mind Total as the only 
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significant predictors within the model (Inhibition Total: β = .12, t = 2.34, p = .02; Theory of 
Mind Total: β = .20, t = 2.13, p = .04).  In order to identify whether these two significant 
predictors added independent explanatory power to the overall model beyond that shared 
between the two variables, two hierarchical regressions were carried out adding first 
Inhibition Total and then Theory of Mind total in the second step.  The first model entered 
Age, BPVS, Working Memory Total and Inhibition Total into the first block, with Theory of 
Mind Total in the second block.  This showed a significant improvement in the model with 
the addition of Theory of Mind (R square change (1, 97) = .04, p = .04). A second 
hierarchical regression entered Age, BPVS, Working Memory and Theory of Mind Total into 
the first block, with Inhibition Total in the second block.  This showed a significant 
improvement by addition of Inhibition Total in the second model (R square change (1, 97) = 
.05, p = .02). This indicates that both Inhibition and Theory of Mind contribute 
independently to individual scores on the Co-representation Residual Score.  In other 
words, variance in performance on the Different task, having controlled for factors shared 
with the Same (control) task is predicted by both individual Inhibitory Control and Theory 
of Mind ability. 
4.   General Discussion 
Firstly, these results replicated the effect of co-representation found in Milward et al. 
(2014).  There was a within-subjects difference between Same and Different task 
performance.  It is valuable to note that these effects can be measured in a within-subjects 
design as well as between subjects, as this will broaden the type of methodologies that can 
be implemented in future research on this topic.  The results of regression analyses suggest 
independent roles of both Theory of Mind and Inhibitory Control in the Bear Duck task, as 
originally predicted.  However, whereas the direction of the relationship with Inhibitory 
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Control was as expected (better Inhibitory Control results in less conflict on the Different 
Task), the direction of the relationship with Theory of Mind was in the opposite direction to 
that predicted.  Specifically, better Theory of Mind predicted better performance on the 
Different Task relative to the Same Task, rather than the other way around.  Additionally, 
although Working Memory correlated with the Residual measure of the Bear Duck task, this 
was not found to contribute once other factors had been included in a regression model.   
Each of these findings will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
The lack of contribution of Working Memory to the overall model suggests that 
Working Memory does not have a role in the Different task that is independent of its role in 
the Same task.  This provides further evidence that differences between task conditions in 
this and other experiments are not due to stronger memory representations for the Same task 
than the Different task, caused by emphasis on instructions in the former.  The version of the 
task used in this study was modified from previous versions in order to attempt to control 
for the possibility that hearing instructions twice in the Same condition could strengthen 
participants’ memory for their task.  Thus, in this version, the Experimenter merely stated 
what her role was in the task, rather than issuing two sets of instructions to two participants. 
However, it is still possible that hearing this statement could have strengthened the child’s 
memory for their own task.  Therefore, the finding in this experiment that working memory 
does not have a role in the Different task over and above that in the Same task provides 
further evidence that task effects are due to co-representation rather than memory 
limitations. 
The finding that Inhibition has a role in the Different task is directly in line with the 
prediction that inhibitory control is required in order to avoid interference caused by co-
representing a partner.  In these studies, conflict caused by the different task is used as a 
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way of measuring co-representation.  However, it is important to note that co-representation 
may be involved in both Same and Different conditions, but that in the Same condition co- 
representation does not cause conflict.  Therefore, the finding that Inhibition is related only 
to the Different task does not necessarily mean that co-representation does not occur in the 
Same task.  Nonetheless, it is a good way of showing that co-representation occurs in such 
joint tasks and that inhibition is required to improve performance in cases where roles are 
complementary. 
These results also show a relationship between Theory of Mind and co-representation in 
a surprising direction, given the previous finding that co-representation effects may have a 
lower bound around 4 years.  This study suggests that Theory of Mind actually helps 
children to perform better on co-representation tasks, rather than impeding them as originally 
predicted.  Despite this relationship being unpredicted, it makes sense if one considers the 
nature of the tasks implemented in the Theory of Mind scale used here.  All three of these 
tasks involve being able to separate one’s own mental state from that of a protagonist.  In the 
Knowledge Access task, one’s own knowledge must be separated from that of a naïve 
protagonist.  This is similar for the Contents False Belief task, although knowledge is 
replaced by belief.  In the Real Apparent Emotion task, one needs to separate one’s own 
knowledge of the protagonist’s true emotion from that portrayed on his face.  When 
considered in this way, it seems reasonable that Theory of Mind actually aids children to 
avoid conflict from a co-actor in a shared task.  Thus, the findings here suggest an indirect 
role of Theory of Mind on the ability to avoid conflict from representations of a partner, 
rather than the originally predicted direct role in co-representation itself. 
These findings therefore do not support the findings from Humphreys and Bedford (2011) 
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that false belief understanding is necessary for co-representation.  Additionally, it fails to 
provide an explanation for the apparent cut-off point where co-representation effects cease to 
be found in this thesis.  Further research should try to identify alternative cognitive abilities 
that develop at around this age that may explain the lower-bound.  This makes it all the more 
important to find new paradigms to study co-representation effects in young children, to 
ensure that the cut-off point cannot be pushed to a lower age with more sensitive tasks.  If 
this were the case, it might open up further opportunities for investigating the role of 
relevant stages of cognitive development on co-representation, such as self-other 
understanding, intentionality and joint goal understanding and lower level perception-action 
links. 
Even though these results have failed to provide an explanation for the onset of co- 
representation, they still make an important contribution to understanding of the processes 
involved in performing joint tasks.  In a task where co-representation has been shown to 
occur (through a Same versus Different task effect), Inhibitory Control and Theory of Mind 
processes are clearly active and essential for efficient performance.  Developing Theory of 
Mind allows children to separate representations of self and other in order to hold both in 
mind simultaneously without detrimental interference.  Inhibitory Control additionally 
provides an opportunity for children to overcome any potential interference that such 
representations may cause when a task partner is performing a complementary rather than 
identical role.  Given the important increase in cognitive capacity in these two domains at 
around the age tested here, it remains important to consider whether the behaviours shown 
at a much earlier age are comparable to adult behaviours.  What seems more likely is that 
several different processes emerge over the course of development (see Carpenter, 2009; 
and Brownell, 2011 for some examples) that help children to build up a more sophisticated 
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understanding of joint action, of which two such stages are likely to be the development of 
Inhibitory Control and explicit Theory of Mind. 
To conclude, these results demonstrate the importance of both Theory of Mind and 
Inhibitory Control in co-representation.  It is hypothesised that these two cognitive capacities 
both play independent roles in the Bear Duck task, although both influence performance in the 
same direction.  Thus, Theory of Mind is argued to aid children in separating representations 
of self and other, whilst Inhibition is argued to help avoid interference caused by co-
representation of a task partner performing a complementary role.  These findings fail to 
explain the apparent cut-off point in co-representation development at around 4 years, which 
should be tested further to ensure that effects cannot be found at a younger age with more 
sensitive tasks.  Such findings would aid further investigation into the cognitive processes that 
underlie co-representation itself, which could be investigated in future individual differences 
studies with young children.
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CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
At the outset, this thesis presented two key questions that remained unanswered by 
previous literature on joint action.  The first question was when children show co-
representation (either of task or actor) in the way that adults have been shown to do so.  If 
children also co- represent, this can be used as a criterion for comparing adult and childhood 
joint action, which has been difficult to do in the past given the problems in identifying key 
requirements for joint action understanding, such as joint goal or intention understanding 
(Bratman, 1992). The second question was regarding the level of processing that is involved 
in co- representation, which has been heavily debated in the adult literature.  Here it is argued 
that if very young children co-represent, this would suggest that co-representation is 
underpinned by fairly simple cognitive mechanisms, which develop early in childhood.  If 
young children do not co-represent, then it is likely that more complex cognitive skills are 
necessary for this tendency to develop.  This thesis reported five experiments that aimed to 
shed light on these questions.  In Chapter 2, three experiments were presented using 
variations on two tasks that found co-representation effects in children aged 4-5 but not in 
children aged 2-3.  In Chapter 
3, the nature of these representations was investigated by manipulating the presence or 
absence of the task partner, in order to see whether children represent joint tasks at a group 
level or whether representations of self and other are independent and separable.  Chapter 4 
presented an individual differences study to examine the cognitive skills that are involved in 
co-representation, given the age at which it appears to develop.  These findings will be 
summarised and critically analysed in more detail in the following sections, followed by a 
discussion of the overall conclusions and contribution of this thesis and concluding with 
ideas for future research on this topic. 
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In Chapter 2, Experiment 1 implemented a simple ‘Simon Says’-like task, where two 4-
5 year-old children played a game together where they were asked to respond to the 
instructions of one or other of two puppets by pointing at pictures on a page.  This 
experiment found that children made more errors when their partner was told to respond to 
a different puppet to the one they themselves had to respond to (Different Task condition) 
than when both children responded to the same puppet (Same Task condition).  This was 
argued to be evidence for co-representation at this age, as co-representing a partner should 
cause interference in the Different Task but not in the Same Task condition.  Although 
control analyses were carried out in order to check that children were not confused by 
hearing two different sets of instructions in the Different Task, a further experiment was 
also carried out to find more direct evidence for the co-representation explanation. This 
experiment repeated the paradigm implemented in Experiment 1, but added a task switch 
half way through the game, where participants had to switch from one task rule to another.  
In the Different Task, this meant switching to the rule that one’s partner had been following 
in the previous block. Thus, if children co-represented their partner in the Different Task 
condition, they should gain a benefit from having previously represented the alternative task 
rule.  The findings confirmed this prediction, in that children in the Different Task condition 
did not show a switch cost on performance whereas children in the Same Task condition did 
so.  However, a further possibility was that hearing two sets of instructions did not confuse 
children about which task they were supposed to be following, but rather that it 
consolidated their memory for their own task in the Same Task condition (where the same 
set of instructions are repeated twice) more so than in the Different Task condition (where 
one’s own instructions are given only once).  So, Experiment 3 aimed to overcome this 
problem by putting the Experimenter in the role of the child’s task partner, which enabled 
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her to give only one set of instructions (to the child) and merely state what she herself was 
going to do in the game.  Experiment 3 also employed a new version of the task, which was 
simplified and computerised in order to test younger children.  Therefore, Experiment 3 not 
only allowed further controlling for alternative explanations of the co-representation 
account, but also allowed testing of 2-3 year- olds to identify whether there was a lower-
bound on co-representation over development. Results, again, showed evidence for co-
representation in 4-5 year-olds, suggesting that the previous findings where due to co-
representation rather than alternative accounts such as confusion or memory overload.  
However, no such effects were found at the Younger age group (29-45 months), suggesting 
that co-representation may be a skill or tendency that develops around the age of 4.  This, at 
present, is a tentative conclusion given the fact that results have only been found with two 
versions of a similar task.  Further research should try to push this lower-bound down using 
different types of task to ensure that results are not task- specific. 
 
Chapter 3 presented a large study that aimed to investigate the nature of the 
representations that are formed during co-representation.  The computerised task from 
Experiment 3 was modified to include the switching element from Experiment 2 and add a 
further factor, ‘Experimenter Presence’.  This new manipulation involved half of 
participants continuing the post-switch phase alongside their task partner, as in Experiment 
2.  For the other half of participants, their task partner (the Experimenter) left the room after 
the switch instructions had been given, but before the post-switch trials had been initiated.  
It was hypothesised that if participants formed what have been termed ‘we’ representations 
(i.e. representations at the group level) then the switch cost that disappeared in Experiment 2 
in the Different Task condition (presumably due to a benefit of representing the alternative 
task in the pre-switch phase) should return when one’s task partner leaves the room.  This is 
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because if ‘our’ task is represented in the pre-switch phase, then the departure of one’s 
partner should make the post-switch phase a novel (individual) task with no benefit to be 
gained from a previous representation of the task at a group level.  Unfortunately, this 
experiment failed to replicate the effect of Task Type or the interaction with the Switch 
manipulation, leaving no possibility for drawing conclusions regarding representation type. 
Reasons for this failure to replicate are discussed in Chapter 3, including duration of 
response windows, task sensitivity and appropriateness of the Experimenter Presence 
manipulation. 
Chapter 4 presents an individual differences study that aimed to uncover the cognitive 
skills that underlie co-representation in 4-5 year-olds.  The main factors that were 
investigated were Working Memory, Inhibitory Control and Theory of Mind, with Age and 
Receptive Vocabulary as control variables.  This study found that both Inhibitory Control 
and Theory of Mind, but no other variables, significantly predicted a measure of Different 
Task variance having controlled for shared variance with the Same Task.  It was concluded 
that Inhibitory Control is likely to play an indirect role in co-representation effects, whereby 
better Inhibitory Control allows children to better overcome the interfering effects of 
representing a partner in a joint task.  The role of Theory of Mind, however, was not as 
initially expected, due to the discovery of a relationship in the opposite direction than 
originally predicted.  Rather than finding that children with better Theory of Mind were 
more likely to co-represent, this study actually found the inverse relationship.  Although this 
finding was unexpected, it makes sense if considering the nature of the task used in the 
Theory of Mind battery employed here.  Accordingly, it seems that children who are able to 
separate their own knowledge or beliefs from that of another person are also more able to 
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separate competing representations of another person’s task or actions in a joint game such 
as the Bear Duck task.   This finding helps to broaden existing knowledge about the 
processes involved in joint action and specifically highlights the importance of two cognitive 
skills that are arguably underdeveloped at the age at which many studies have shown 
evidence for what appears to be joint action understanding at around 1-2 years.  Thus, it 
seems likely that several processes are involved in joint action understanding which develop 
over early childhood, some of which may not be fully developed until later on in the pre-
school years. 
Unfortunately, these experiments fail to find an explanation for the apparent lower-
bound on co-representation effects at around 4 years.  The two cognitive skills found to 
relate to performance on the joint task used here did not seem to affect co-representation 
itself, but rather the ability to avoid detrimental interference in circumstances where a 
partner’s actions or task differ from one’s own.  Thus, further research is needed to identify 
whether this finding of a lower-bound is stable across different tasks, and accordingly what 
processes are directly involved in the onset of this phenomenon. 
Overall, the experiments in this thesis have contributed to debates on both joint action 
development and the underlying processes of co-representation.  In terms of joint action 
development, the current finding that co-representation appears to have a lower-bound 
around age 4 years suggests that co-representation is not a mechanism used by younger 
children when performing the ‘joint’ tasks seen in existing studies.  This clearly does not 
mean that there are not other mechanisms that children use to perform such behaviours (see 
Brownell, 2011 and Carpenter, 2009 for a review of alternative mechanisms for early joint 
action), nor that these mechanisms do not allow the level of understanding required by 
certain definitions of joint action (Bratman, 1992; Butterfill & Sebanz, 2011).  However, the 
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fact that a process that has been shown to play a major role in the joint action abilities of 
adults is not used by young children casts doubt on the degree to which early and mature 
joint action understanding can be compared.  The variation between different definitions of 
joint action understanding in existing literature causes difficulties in assessing whether the 
capacities of children can be deemed ‘true’ understanding.  However, by outlining ways in 
which early and later developing cognition can be directly compared, rather than setting 
different goal posts for what is meant by genuine understanding, a clearer picture of 
development can be achieved. 
In terms of understanding the processes underlying co-representation this thesis has made 
some important contributions, although these are perhaps less clear-cut than those made to 
the joint action development literature.  The finding that co-representation may have a 
developmental lower-bound implies that children younger than 4 years may not have the 
cognitive capacity to co-represent.  Accordingly, this indicates that co-representation may 
require higher level skills, which are later developing.  This supports existing evidence that 
certain social conditions (Atmaca et al., 2011; Tsai et al., 2008) and subsequently inferred 
social cognitive processes are necessary for co-representation to occur.  However, the 
results from the individual differences in Chapter 4 failed to identify which, if any, such 
processes are directly involved in co-representation development, despite producing 
interesting findings regarding the processes involved in joint action performance in general.  
These results are a stepping stone to further questioning the processes involved in joint 
action in general, whether they can be compared between adults and children, and what 
level of cognition is required for co-representation as a specific mechanism for joint action. 
However, what remains unclear is the nature of representations formed in joint scenarios. 
As outlined in the General Introduction, several different suggestions have been made 
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regarding the nature of joint representations in co-representation tasks, including 
representations of actions (Sebanz et al., 2003), turn-taking (Wenke et al., 2011) or even 
non- social explanations (Dolk et al., 2013).  Chapter 3 aimed to shed light on this question, 
but unfortunately did not elicit any interpretable results.  Thus, the question of what is 
represented in co-representation remains unclear.  The nature of ‘me’, ‘you’ and ‘we’ 
representations is an interesting question for future research and novel ways of uncovering 
information about representation type would be greatly beneficial to existing literature. 
Discovering whether both children and adults form ‘we’ representations and when they do 
so would provide insight into how representations of a partner in joint action work to 
produce the most effective result.  For example, it may be that forming a representation at 
the group level helps individuals to understand the relations between self and other actions 
in order to integrate them appropriately and alter one’s own behaviour accordingly.  This 
may provide more information than simply representing ‘self’ and ‘other’ without including 
information about how the two link together.  This question is of particular interest in the 
study of children’s development, as it could provide an important contribution to the debate 
on how children learn from or about other people.  As outlined in Chapter 3, several 
conflicting theories have been put forward to explain how children form representations of 
self and other and in particular the direction in which this learning occurs.  One possibility is 
that children first gain understanding of their own actions, intentions, beliefs etc. and then 
map these onto other people based on visual cues to their behaviour (e.g. Meltzoff, 2007).  
An alternative is that children first gain understanding of others, which they associate with 
external signs displayed by other people.  They then come to associate these outward 
expressions of inward mental states with their own actions, and thus come to understand 
their own mental states (Prinz, 2012).  By uncovering what types of representations are held 
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by young children and when (or if) they develop further types of representation, further 
evidence can be gained to add to these debates. 
In addition to providing information that informs some of the questions presented at the 
outset, the experiments and subsequent discussions presented here also open up some further 
questions and avenues for future investigation.  One such question concerns the sensitivity 
of the measures employed in these studies.  A key issue surrounding the conclusion that co- 
representation has a lower-bound is that it is possible that effects were not observed below 4 
years due to a lack of sensitivity or appropriateness of the tasks used.  There are reasons to 
believe that the tasks used here were, in fact, appropriate for even this younger age group. 
One reason is that the distribution of data from the Younger age group was similar to that in 
the Middle and Older year-old groups.  Standard deviations for each group were similar, 
suggesting that the absence of an effect in the Younger group was unlikely to be due to 
increase variation caused by noise in the data.  Additionally, proportion correct in the 
Younger group was above chance, suggesting that the lack of an effect in response times 
was unlikely to be due to a lack of understanding of the task in younger children.  However, 
it remains possible that the tasks used here were simply not able to detect co-representation 
effects in younger children, perhaps due to them being smaller than those for older children. 
Future research should attempt to test this by designing alternative paradigms that can be 
employed with the age group used in the Younger group in this study.  One way of doing 
this would be to design tasks that are more realistic in terms of their similarity to games that 
young children participate in in their natural environment.  Some of the tasks used in the 
joint action development literature achieve a more naturalistic design, and thus could be 
modified in order to test co-representation effects at a young age.  This would also have the 
advantage of making the results from co-representation experiments more comparable to 
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those seen in these studies.  Replication of a cut-off point for co-representation using this 
type of task would add confidence to the results seen in the studies here. 
Another improvement that could be made to the current design would be to improve the 
dependent measures that identify co-representation effects.  Although response times have 
been frequently used as evidence for co-representation in adult samples, it is much more 
difficult to gain analysable data from young children using this measure.  Here, we have 
been able to do this, but the results have not always been replicable and effect sizes have 
been relatively small.  One way of improving this would be to use a measure, such as 
motion- tracking, that is more inclusive in its measurement of responses.  It was observed in 
the current experiments that children often made ‘half-movements’ towards a stimulus, but 
managed to refrain from actually pressing the response button at the last moment.  This 
indicates a considerable loss of data caused by the inability to measure these half responses. 
One option that is more economical than motion-tracking, is to implement two button-based 
response measures.  Accordingly, children should keep a button pressed down at all times 
and release it in order to press another, target response button.  Thus, both the time taken to 
initiate an action, as well as the time taken to complete the action would be recorded. 
However, it seems unlikely that children of this young age would be disciplined enough to 
keep a button pressed throughout the whole experiment.  Thus, motion-tracking is likely to 
be a more effective method given the current population. 
Another avenue for future research, given the current evidence of a role of Theory of 
Mind in this type of joint task, is to introduce social manipulations to tasks with children to 
identify which are the key features of the social environment that are relevant to forming 
representations in a joint task.  Such manipulations have been introduced in several studies 
on adult co-representation, some of which were outlined in the General Introduction.  These 
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manipulations have included co-actor presence and intentionality of the co-actor (Atmaca et 
al., 2011), identity of the co-actor (computer versus human; Tsai et al., 2008) and group 
membership of the co-actor and perspective-taking (Müller, Kühn, van Baaren, Dotsch, 
Brass & Dijksterhuis, 2011).  It would be interesting and informative to identify whether 
these social factors also influence children’s co-representation in a joint context. This could 
not only serve to increase confidence in the current conclusion regarding the importance of 
social cognition in avoiding interference from co-representing a partner, but also further 
illuminate the specific types of social understanding that are required. 
One exciting possibility is that there may be a difference in co-representation 
depending on whether children are acting alongside a peer versus a parent or caregiver.  
Evidence has shown that children show more ‘joint action’ behaviours when playing 
games with a caregiver rather than a peer (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984).  Although there is 
doubt over whether these behaviours constitute a genuine understanding of joint action, 
they still highlight a potential difference in terms of social learning from a joint context 
dependent on the identity of the co-actor.  There are reasons to think that joint action in 
general or co- representation in particular might be more likely to occur when children act 
alongside an adult caregiver.  According to Vygotsky’s Zone of Proximal Development, 
children develop their cognitive skills through interaction with caregivers, who have a 
higher level of cognitive ability than the child.  These skills that are learned in an 
interactive context then become internalised and can thus be used individually.  The 
experiments in this thesis featured either a peer or an adult stranger as the co-actor in a 
joint task.  Potential differences in performance due to co-actor identity cannot be 
identified in these experiments, as different tasks were used for different co-actor types.  It 
would be interesting to design a version of the paradigm that could directly compare 
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performance alongside a peer versus an adult and even more interesting if that adult were 
the child’s caregiver.  A finding that demonstrated earlier development of co-
representation of a caregiver than a peer would provide evidence for a mechanism for 
internalisation and learning from experts in a joint context. 
Another avenue for further investigation is to dig deeper into the types of Theory of 
Mind representations that are relevant for separating representations of self and other.  The 
individual differences study in Chapter 4 uncovered a relationship between performance on a 
complementary joint task and a Theory of Mind scale, made up of three different tasks. 
These tasks measured slightly different types of Theory of Mind ability.  These were 
Knowledge Access, Contents False Belief and Real-Apparent Emotion.  Although it was 
the overall score from all three tasks that significantly predicted co-representation here, it is 
possible that one or other of the tasks played a more important role.  None of these tasks 
correlated with co-representation when analysed individually, however it is possible that 
there was not enough variation within each individual task to show an effect, given the 
binomial nature of scores.  There are reasons to suspect that some of these tasks might be 
more closely related to performance on the current paradigm than others, due to the 
demands of the task.  For example, the Contents False Belief task required children to hold 
in mind two competing representations of a mental state (own knowledge versus other’s 
belief).  In contrast, the Knowledge Access task only required children to acknowledge that 
the other had different knowledge to their own, without having to represent what that 
knowledge was exactly.  In this sense, the Contents False Belief task seems more similar to 
the co- representation task, in that to co-represent a partner and experience the 
corresponding interference one arguably needs to hold specific information about both 
one’s own task and one’s partner’s task in mind at once.  In contrast, the ability to 
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understand simply that one’s partner is doing ‘something different’ to themselves, may not 
necessarily help children to avoid interference from specific task rule representations.  This 
is related to the question from the adult literature on what type of representations are 
involved in co-representation tasks, in that if co-representation requires specific knowledge 
of what is being done (Sebanz et al., 2003), then perhaps false belief may be a more 
analogous skill.  In contrast, if co- representation requires understanding merely when 
something is being done (Wenke et al., 2011), this may be more related to Knowledge 
Access-type tasks, as specific representations of the identity of the hidden object/nature of 
action to be performed are not represented and therefore do not conflict with one another.  
Real-Apparent Emotion also involves holding in mind two competing representations in the 
same way as the Contents False Belief task, but is made more complicated by the fact that 
the ‘reality’ state is also an emotion, as well as the fact that some understanding of 
deception is required in order to understand the behaviour of the protagonist in portraying 
an inaccurate facial expression.  These details seem less comparable to the co-
representation task, where there is no state of ‘reality’ or deception involved.  Thus, it 
seems likely that the Contents False Belief task is the most relevant to avoidance of co-
representation, although this is merely speculative given the lack of correlations with 
individual tasks in the current data. 
Additionally, it is possible that types of mental representation other than those included 
in the current task might be relevant to co-representation.  Given the existing debate on pre- 
requisites for joint action, intentionality understanding seems an obvious example. 
Understanding of another’s intention involves knowing that they plan to carry out a certain 
action in order to achieve a given goal.  In the case of joint action, it is necessary to keep this 
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representation of a co-actor’s intention in mind alongside a representation of one’s own goals 
and action plans, or even in a single representation at the group level (see earlier discussion 
on ‘we’ representations).  Intention understanding is generally accepted to develop relatively 
early on in childhood, at around 1-2 years (Tomasello et al., 2005; Gergely et al., 2002).  
This is certainly much earlier than many other mental states such as explicit false belief.  
Although shared intentionality has already been proposed as a framework for children’s joint 
action development (Carpenter, 2009; Tomasello et al., 2005), its relationship (or lack 
thereof) with co-representation has not yet been directly tested in children.  Given the 
specifications of existing definitions of joint action (Bratman, 1992, Butterfill & Sebanz, 
2011), which include either joint goal or intentionality understanding, it would be helpful to 
identify the role of these skills in co-representation, in keeping with the idea that this 
phenomenon allows us to directly compare behaviour with adults.  This would also add to 
the debate in the adult co- representation literature on whether intentionality understanding is 
necessary for co- representation. 
In conclusion, the five experiments presented in this thesis contribute to the two main 
research questions proposed at the outset.  Firstly, they provide evidence for a lower-bound 
on co-representation in development, whereby children younger than about 4 years do not 
show the same interference from a co-actor as adults have been shown to.  Further 
evidence indicates that this tendency can be more easily overcome as both Theory of Mind 
and Inhibitory Control capacities develop with age.  This contributes to the debate in joint 
action development research regarding whether early joint behaviours are really showing a 
true understanding of the joint nature of the task, by demonstrating that children are not 
comparable to adults for at least for one mechanism of joint action.  Thus, it might be 
necessary to redefine what we observe in these early development studies in order to 
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account for children’s limited cognitive capacity.  Further, this also provides some insight 
into the nature of co-representation itself.  Although the relational nature of representations 
is still uncertain given the null results of Experiment 4, Experiment 5 provides evidence 
regarding the requirements for overcoming co-representation, by highlighting the role of 
Theory of Mind and Inhibitory Control.  However, these results fail to uncover a direct 
relationship between any particular cognitive skill and co-representation itself, 
consequently leaving the question open as to why there might be a lower limit on the 
phenomenon in development. 
Joint action can be defined in different ways, which causes confusion over how it 
develops and who is capable of participating in it.  Here, it is argued that a good way of 
reconciling existing data in the face of different definitions is to directly compare the abilities 
of adults and children and identify ways in which they differ.  If the goalposts for children 
are lowered, the important differences and developments over maturation may be missed.  
The current results indicate that one such difference is in ability to co-represent, with 
younger children apparently incapable of doing so, perhaps due to limitations in key 
cognitive capacities.  Additionally, once this tendency has developed, its detrimental side 
effects must be overcome under the right circumstances in order to perform efficient joint 
actions, which this research suggests may involve at least two higher level cognitive skills.  
Children, like flocking starlings, thus appear to fall short of the full set of interactive abilities 
that are established in later development.  What remains to be seen is how they finally come 
to achieve this and to what purpose each process serves in building up from ‘simple’ dyadic 
interaction to complex society formation.
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Appendices 
Appendix E.  Real-Apparent Emotion script for Chapter 4, Individual differences study. 
Initially, children see a sheet of paper with three faces drawn on it – a happy, a neutral, 
and a sad face – to check that the child knows these emotional expressions. Then that paper is 
put aside, and the task begins with the child being shown a cardboard cutout figure of a boy 
drawn from the back so that the boy’s facial expression cannot be seen. 
 
“Look, I have got some faces for you. Can you point which one is happy? And which 
one is okay? And which one is sad? 
 
This story is about a boy. I’m going to ask you about how the boy really feels inside and 
how he looks on his face. He might really feel one way inside but look a different way on his 
face. Or, he might really feel the same way inside as he looks on his face. I want you to tell 
me how he really feels inside and how he looks on his face. 
 
This Story is about Matt. Matt’s friends were playing together and telling jokes. One of 
the older children, Rosie, told a mean joke about Matt and everyone laughed. Everyone 
thought it was very funny, but not Matt. But, Matt didn’t want the other children to see 
how he felt about the joke, because they would call him a baby. So, Matt tried to hide how 
he felt.” 
 
Then the child gets two memory checks. 
 
“So do you remember?” 
 
“What did the other children do when Rosie told a mean joke about Matt? 
 
 
 
“In the story, what would the other children do if they knew how Matt felt?” 
 
 
 
Pointing to the three emotion pictures. 
 
“So, how did Matt really feel, when everyone laughed? Did he feel happy, sad, or 
okay?” 
 
 
 
“How did Matt try to look on his face, when everyone laughed? Did he look happy, 
sad or okay? 
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Appendix F.  Pig and Penguin stimuli for Chapter 4, Individual differences study. 
 
